[The ancient commentators on Aristotle]

"Aristotle's Physics is about the causes of motion and culminates in a proof that God is needed as the ultimate cause of motion. Aristotle argues that things in motion need to be moved by something other than themselves - he rejects Plato's self-movers. On pain of regress, there must be an unmoved mover. If this unmoved mover is to cause motion eternally, it needs infinite power. It cannot, then, be a body, since bodies, being of finite size, cannot house infinite power. The unmoved mover is therefore an incorporeal God.". "Simplicius reveals that his teacher, Ammonius, harmonized Aristotle with Plato to counter Christian charges of pagan disagreement, by making Aristotle's God a cause not only of beginningless movement, but also of beginningless existence of the universe. Eternal existence, no less than eternal motion, calls for an infinite, and hence incorporeal, force. This anti-Christian interpretation turned Aristotle's God from a thinker into a certain kind of Creator, and so helped to make Aristotle's God acceptable to Saint Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century."--BOOK JACKET.

"Simplicius starts with a survey of previous commentators and an introductory set of questions about Aristotle's philosophy and about the Categories in particular. The commentator, he says, needs to present Plato and Aristotle as in harmony in most things."-- Publisher description. "Why were precisely ten categories named, given that Plato managed with fewer distinctions? Where in the scheme of categories would one fit a quality that defines a substance - under substance or under quality? In his own commentary, Porphyry suggested classifying a defining quality as something distinct, a substantial quality, but others objected that this would constitute an eleventh category. The most persistent question dealt with in Simplicius' commentary is whether the categories classify words, concepts, or things."--BOOK JACKET.

The commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.8-22 is a very important text, being the main ancient commentary with chapters in which Aristotle invented modal logic - the logic of propositions about what is necessary or contingent (possible). The first volume of Ian Mueller's translation covered chapters 1.8-13, and reached as far as the chapter in which Aristotle discussed the notion of contingency. In this, the second volume, the 'greatest' commentator, Alexander, concludes his discussion of Aristotle's modal logic. Aristotle also invented the syllogism, a style of argument involving two premises and a conclusion. Modal propositions can be deployed in syllogisms, and in the chapters included in this volume Aristotle discusses all the syllogisms containing at least one contingent premiss. In each volume, Ian Mueller provides a comprehensive explanation of Alexander's commentary on modal logic as a whole.

The first five chapters of Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione distinguish creation and destruction from mere qualitative change and from growth. They include a fascinating debate about the atomists' analysis of creation and destruction as due to the rearrangement of indivisible atoms. Aristotle's rival belief in the infinite divisibility of matter is explained and defended against the atomists' powerful attack on infinite divisibility. But what inspired Philoponus most in his commentary is the topic of organic growth. How does it take place without ingested matter getting into the same place as the growing body? And how is personal identity preserved, if our matter is always in flux, and our form depends on our matter? If we do not depend on the persistence of matter why are we not immortal? Analogous problems of identity arise also for inanimate beings. Philoponus draws out a brief remark of Aristotle's to show that cause need not be like effect. For example, what makes something hard may be cold, not hard. This goes against a persistent philosophical prejudice, but Philoponus makes it plausible that Aristotle recognized this truth. These topics of identity over time and the principles of causation are still matters of intense discussion.

Book 3 of Aristotle's Physics elaborates definitions of change and infinity - concepts central to his theory of nature. In a sixth-century commentary on Physics 3, Philoponus makes use of Aristotle's views to argue for a Christian interpretation of infinity. In Physics Book 2, Aristotle defines nature as an internal source of change. By elaborating Aristotle's view of change, Book 3 takes an important step in establishing the claim - to be made in Book 8 - for a divine mover who causes change but in whom no change occurs. Book 3 also introduces Aristotle's doctrine of infinity as always potential, but never actual and never traversed. Here, as elsewhere, Philoponus turns Aristotle's arguments about infinity against the pagan Neoplatonist belief in a universe without a beginning.

"Aristotle classified the things in the world into ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, etcetera. Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, attacked the classification, accepting only the first four categories, rejecting the other six, and adding one of his own: change. He preferred Plato's classification into five kinds, including change. In this part of his commentary, Simplicius records the controversy on the six categories rejected by Plotinus: acting, being acted upon, being in a position, when, where, and having on. Plotinus' pupil and editor, Porphyry, defended all six categories as applicable to the physical world, even if not to the world of Platonic Forms to which Platonist studies must eventually progress. Porphyry's pupil, Iamblichus, went further: taken in a suitable sense, Aristotle's categories apply also to the world of Forms, although they require Pythagorean reinterpretation. Simplicius may be closer to Porphyry than to Iamblichus, and indeed Porphyry's defense established Aristotle's categories once and for all in Western thought. But the controversy of this period nonetheless revealed more effectively than any modern discussion the profound difficulties in Aristotle's categorial scheme."--BOOK JACKET.

"Physics Book 4 is one of Aristotle's most interesting works, discussing place, time and vacuum. Themistius was a fourth-century AD orator and essayist, not only a philosopher, and he thought that only paraphrases of Aristotle were needed, because there were already such comprehensive commentaries. Nonetheless, his paraphrastic commentaries are full of innovative comment. According to Aristotle, there is no such thing as 3-dimensional space. A thing's exactly-fitting place is a surface, the inner surface of its immediate surroundings. One problem that this created was that the outermost stars, on Aristotle's view, have no surroundings, and so no place. Themistius suggests that we might think instead of the neighbouring bodies which they surround as providing their place. Aristotle time as something countable, and concluded that it depends for its existence on that of conscious beings to do the counting. Themistius is in the minority among commentators in disagreeing. Themistius concurs with Aristotle in denying the existence of vacuum. We cannot think that a space formerly empty of body penetrates right through a body inserted into it. If one extension could penetrate another, says Themistius, a body could penetrate a body, because bodies occupy places solely in virtue of being extended."--Bloomsbury Publishing Physics Book 4 is one of Aristotle's most interesting works, discussing place, time and vacuum. Themistius was a fourth-century AD orator and essayist, not only a philosopher, and he thought that only paraphrases of Aristotle were needed, because there were already such comprehensive commentaries. Nonetheless, his paraphrastic commentaries are full of innovative comment. According to Aristotle, there is no such thing as 3-dimensional space. A thing's exactly-fitting place is a surface, the inner surface of its immediate surroundings. One problem that this created was that the outermost stars, in Aristotle's view, have no surroundings, and so no place. Themistius suggests that we might think instead of the neighbouring bodies which they surround as providing their place. Aristotle saw time as something countable, and concluded that it depends for its existence on that of conscious beings to do the counting. Themistius is in the minority among commentators in disagreeing. Themistius concurs with Aristotle in denying the existence of vacuum. We cannot think that a space formerly empty of body penetrates right through a body inserted into it. If one extension could penetrate another, says Themistius, a body could penetrate a body, because bodies occupy places solely in virtue of being extended.

"Aristotle's Metaphysics 2 consists of two chapters on methodology flanking an important discussion of the impossibility of infinite causal chains. The subject is vital for scientific method and for theological belief in a first cause and in a beginning of the universe. Philoponus later attacked Aristotle on this last point, but Alexander presents Aristotle's view in a most favourable light. In Metaphysics 3, Aristotle sets out what he sees as the central problems of metaphysics. Alexander's commentary was subsequently used by the Neoplatonists, two of whom have left their own commentaries, so that Alexander's Aristotelian interpretation can be compared with its rivals."--Bloomsbury Publishing Aristotle's Metaphysics 2 consists of two chapters on methodology flanking an important discussion of the impossibility of infinite causal chains. The subject is vital for scientific method and for theological belief in a first cause and in a beginning of the universe. Philoponus later attacked Aristotle on this last point, but Alexander presents Aristotle's view in a most favourable light. In Metaphysics 3, Aristotle sets out what he sees as the central problems of metaphysics. Alexander's commentary was subsequently used by the Neoplatonists, two of whom have left their own commentaries, so that Alexander's Aristotelian interpretation can be compared with its rivals.

"Proclus' On the Existence of Evils is not a commentary, but helps to compensate for the dearth of Neoplatonist ethical commentaries. The central question addressed in the work is: How can there be evil in a providential world? Neoplatonists agree that it cannot be caused by higher and worthier beings. Plotinus had said that evil is matter, which, unlike Aristotle, he collapsed into mere privation or lack, thus reducing its reality. He also protected higher causes from responsibility by saying that evil may result from a combination of goods. Proclus objects: evil is real, and not the mere privation of form. Rather, it is a parasite feeding off good. Parasites have no proper cause, and higher beings are thus vindicated as being the causes only of the good off which evil feeds."--BOOK JACKET.

"The Enchiridion or Handbook of the first-century AD Stoic Epictetus was used as an ethical treatise both in Christian monasteries and by the sixth-century pagan Neoplatonist Simplicius. Simplicius chose it for beginners, rather than Aristotle's Ethics, because it presupposed no knowledge of logic. We thus get a fascinating chance to see how a pagan Neoplatonist transformed Stoic ideas. The text was relevant to Simplicius because he too, like Epictetus, was teaching beginners how to take the first steps towards eradicating emotion, although he is unlike Epictetus in thinking that they should give up public life rather than acquiesce, if public office is denied them. Simplicius starts from a Platonic definition of the person as rational soul, not body, ignoring Epictetus' further whittling down of himself to just his will or policy decisions. He selects certain topics for special attention in chapters 1, 8, 27 and 31. Things are up to us, despite Fate. Our sufferings are not evil, but providential attempts to turn us from the body. Evil is found only in the human soul. But evil is parasitic (Proclus' term) on good. The gods exist, are provident, and cannot be bought off.With nearly all of this the Stoics would agree, but for quite different reasons, and their own distinctions and definitions are to a large extent ignored. This translation of the Handbook is published in two volumes. This is the second volume, covering chapters 27-53; the first covers chapters 1-26"--Bloomsbury Publishing The Enchiridion or Handbook of the first-century AD Stoic Epictetus was used as an ethical treatise both in Christian monasteries and by the sixth-century pagan Neoplatonist Simplicius. Simplicius chose it for beginners, rather than Aristotle's Ethics, because it presupposed no knowledge of logic. We thus get a fascinating chance to see how a pagan Neoplatonist transformed Stoic ideas. The text was relevant to Simplicius because he too, like Epictetus, was teaching beginners how to take the first steps towards eradicating emotion, although he is unlike Epictetus in thinking that they should give up public life rather than acquiesce, if public office is denied them. Simplicius starts from a Platonic definition of the person as rational soul, not body, ignoring Epictetus' further whittling down of himself to just his will or policy decisions. He selects certain topics for special attention in chapters 1, 8, 27 and 31. Things are up to us, despite Fate. Our sufferings are not evil, but providential attempts to turn us from the body. Evil is found only in the human soul. But evil is parasitic (Proclus' term) on good. The gods exist, are provident, and cannot be bought off.With nearly all of this the Stoics would agree, but for quite different reasons, and their own distinctions and definitions are to a large extent ignored. This translation of the Handbook is published in two volumes. This is the second volume, covering chapters 27-53; the first covers chapters 1-26.

"In Categories Chapters 7 and 8, Aristotle considers his third and fourth categories - those of Relative and Quality. Critics of Aristotle had suggested for each of the non-substance categories that they could really be reduced to relatives, so it is important how the category of Relative is defined. Aristotle offers two definitions, and the second, stricter one is often cited by his defenders in order to rule out objections.". "The second definition of relative involves the idea of something changing its relationship through a change undergone by its correlate, not by itself. There were disagreements as to whether this was genuine change, and Plotinus discussed whether relatives exist only in the mind, without being real. The term used by Aristotle for such relationships was "being disposed relatively to something," a term later borrowed by the Stoics for their fourth category, and perhaps originating in Plato's Academy.". "In his discussion of Quality, Aristotle reports a debate on whether justice admits of degrees, or whether only the possession of justice does so. Simplicius reports the further development of this controversy in terms of whether justice admits a range or latitude (platos). This debate helped to inspire the medieval idea of latitude of forms, which thus goes back much further than is commonly recognized - at least as far in the past as Plato and Aristotle."--BOOK JACKET.

"Chapters 5 and 6 of Aristotle's Categories describe his first two categories, Substance and Quantity. It is usually thought that Plotinus attacked Aristotle's Categories, but that Porphyry and Iamblichus restored it to the curriculum once and for all. However, Frans de Haas stresses that Porphyry drew much of his defense of Aristotle from Plotinus' critical discussion.". "Simplicius' commentary is the most comprehensive account of the debate on the validity of Aristotle's Categories. Simplicius discusses where the differentia of a species (for instance, the rationality of humans) fits into the scheme of categories. Another is why Aristotle elevates the category of Quantity to second place, above the category of Quality. Further, de Haas shows how Simplicius arrives at multiple definitions of "universal" to solve some of the problems."--BOOK JACKET.

Themistius ran his own philosophical school in Constantinople in the middle of the fourth century A.D. His paraphrases of Aristotle's writings are unlike the elaborate commentaries produced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, or the later Neoplatonists Simplicius and Philoponus. His aim was to provide a clear and independent restatement of Aristotle's text which would be accessible as an elementary exegesis. But he also discusses important philosophical problems, reports and disagrees with other commentaries including the lost commentary of Porphyry, and offers interpretations of Plato. Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's On the Soul is his most important and influential work. It is also the first extant commentary on this work of Aristotle to survive from antiquity. A rival to that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, it represents one of the main interpretations of Aristotle's theory of the intellect, which was debated throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It continues to be an important text for the reconstruction of Aristotle's philosophical psychology today.