Ancient commentators on Aristotle

"Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories' is the most comprehensive philosophical critique of the work ever written, representing 600 years of criticism. In his Categories, Aristotle divides what exists in the sensible world into ten categories of Substance, Quantity, Relative, Quality and so on. Simplicius starts with a survey of previous commentators, and an introductory set of questions about Aristotle's philosophy and about the Categories in particular. The commentator, he says, needs to present Plato and Aristotle as in harmony on most things. Why are precisely ten categories named, given that Plato did with fewer distinctions? We have a survey of views on this. And where in the scheme of categories would one fit a quality that defines a substance?--under substance or under quality? In his own commentary, Porphyry suggested classifying a defining quality as something distinct, a substantial quality, but others objected that this would constitute an eleventh. The most persistent question dealt with here is whether the categories classify words, concepts, or things."--Bloomsbury Publishing Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Categories is the most comprehensive philosophical critique of the work ever written, representing 600 years of criticism. In his Categories, Aristotle divides what exists in the sensible world into ten categories of Substance, Quantity, Relative, Quality and so on. Simplicius starts with a survey of previous commentators, and an introductory set of questions about Aristotle's philosophy and about the Categories in particular. The commentator, he says, needs to present Plato and Aristotle as in harmony on most things. Why are precisely ten categories named, given that Plato did with fewer distinctions? We have a survey of views on this. And where in the scheme of categories would one fit a quality that defines a substance - under substance or under quality? In his own commentary, Porphyry suggested classifying a defining quality as something distinct, a substantial quality, but others objected that this would constitute an eleventh. The most persistent question dealt with here is whether the categories classify words, concepts, or things.

"Porphyry's On Abstinence from Killing Animals is one of the most interesting books from Greek antiquity for both philosophers and historians. In it, Porphyry relates the arguments for eating or sacrificing animals and then goes on to argue that an understanding of humans and gods shows such sacrifice to be inappropriate, that an understanding of animals shows it to be unjust, and that a knowledge of non-Greeks shows it to be unnecessary.". "There are no Neoplatonist commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics from the period AD 250-600. Thus, although this work is not a commentary on Aristotle, it fills a gap in this series by going to the heart of ethical debates among Neoplatonists around AD 300, and revealing one ascetic Neoplatonist's view of the ideal way of life. It also records rival positions taken on the treatment of animals by Greek philosophers over the previous six hundred years."--BOOK JACKET.

"Aristotle's Meteorology Book 4 provides an account of the formation of minerals, metals and other homogeneous stuffs. Eric Lewis argues that, in doing so, it offers fresh insight into Aristotle's concept of matter. The four elements (earth, air, fire and water) do have matter, and their matter is the contraries - hot and cold, moist and dry. Lewis further argues that in the text translated here, the only extant ancient commentary on the Meteorology, Alexander of Aphrodisias supports this interpretation of Aristotle. Such a conception of matter complements the account given at an earlier point in the corpus of Aristotle's work in On Generation and Corruption and is confirmed by the account at later points in the biological works, although it adds further detail. Meteorology 4 emerges as an important book. Alexander's commentary is here translated into English for the first time."--Bloomsbury Publishing Aristotle's Meteorology Book 4 provides an account of the formation of minerals, metals and other homogeneous stuffs. Eric Lewis argues that, in doing so, it offers fresh insight into Aristotle's concept of matter. The four elements (earth, air, fire and water) do have matter, and their matter is the contraries - hot and cold, moist and dry. Lewis further argues that in the text translated here, the only extant ancient commentary on the Meteorology, Alexander of Aphrodisias supports this interpretation of Aristotle. Such a conception of matter complements the account given at an earlier point in the corpus of Aristotle's work in On Generation and Corruption and is confirmed by the account at later points in the biological works, although it adds further detail. Meteorology 4 emerges as an important book. Alexander's commentary is here translated into English for the first time.

"Porphyry (ad 232/3 - c. 305) is of crucial importance for the history of Aristotelian studies. Born in Tyre and a student of Plotinus in Rome, he later defended Aristotle's Categories against Plotinus, arguing that they were entirely compatible with Platonism. His intervention was decisive: the Categories became a basic textbook of logic for all subsequent Neoplatonist teaching and influenced both the Arabic and Western Traditions. Boethius drew heavily on Porphyry's treatment. The full commentary is lost, but a shorter version survives and is translated here."--Bloomsbury Publishing Porphyry (AD 232/3 - C.305) is of crucial importance for the history of Aristotelian studies. Born in Tyre and a student of Plotinus in Rome, he later defended Aristotle's Categories against Plotinus, arguing that they were entirely compatible with Platonism. His intervention was decisive: the Categories became a basic textbook of logic for all subsequent Neoplatonist teaching and influenced both the Arabic and Western Traditions. Boethius drew heavily on Porphyry's treatment. The full commentary is lost, but a shorter version survives and is translated here.

"In On The Soul 2.1-6, Aristotle gives a very different account of the sould from Plato's by tying the soul to the body. The soul is the life-manifesting capacities that we all have and that distinguish living things, and explain their behaviour. He defines sould and life by reference to the capacities for using food to maintain structure and reproduce, for perceiving and desiring, and for rational thought. Capacities have to be defined by reference to the objects to which they are directed. The five senses, for example, are defined by reference to their objects, which are primarily forms like colour. And in perception we are said to receive these forms without matter. Philoponus understands this reception not physiologically as the eye jelly's taking on colour patches, but 'cognitively', like Brentano, who much later thought that Aristotle was treating the forms as intentional objects. Philoponus is the patron of non-physiological interpretations, which are still a matter of controversy today."--Bloomsbury Publishing In On The Soul 2.1-6, Aristotle differs from Plato in his account of the soul, by tying it to the body. The soul is the life-manifesting capacities that we all have and that distinguish living things, and explain their behaviour. He defines soul and life by reference to the capacities for using food to maintain structure and reproduce, for perceiving and desiring, and for rational thought. Capacities have to be defined by reference to the objects to which they are directed. The five senses, for example, are defined by reference to their objects which are primarily forms like colour. And in perception we are said to receive these forms without matter. Philoponus understands this reception not physiologically as the eye jelly's taking on colour patches, but 'cognitively', like Brentano, who much later thought that Aristotle was treating the forms as intentional objects. Philoponus is the patron of non-physiological interpretations, which are still a matter of controversy today.

"Themistius ran his philosophical school in Constantinople in the middle of the fourth century A.D. His paraphrases of Aristotle's writings are unlike the elaborate commentaries produced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, or the later Neoplatonists Simplicius and Philoponus. His aim was to provide a clear and independent restatement of Aristotle's text which would be accessible as an elementary exegesis. But he also discusses important philosophical problems, reports and disagrees with other commentaries including the lost commentary of Porphyry, and offers interpretations of Plato. Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's On the Soul is his most important and influential work. It is also the first extant commentary on this work of Aristotle to survive from antiquity. A rival to that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, it represents one of the main interpretations of Aristotle's theory of the intellect, which was debated throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It continues to be an important text for the reconstruction of Aristotle's philosophical psychology today."--Bloomsbury Publishing Themistius ran his philosophical school in Constantinople in the middle of the fourth century A.D. His paraphrases of Aristotle's writings are unlike the elaborate commentaries produced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, or the later Neoplatonists Simplicius and Philoponus. His aim was to provide a clear and independent restatement of Aristotle's text which would be accessible as an elementary exegesis. But he also discusses important philosophical problems, reports and disagrees with other commentaries including the lost commentary of Porphyry, and offers interpretations of Plato. Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's On the Soul is his most important and influential work. It is also the first extant commentary on this work of Aristotle to survive from antiquity. A rival to that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, it represents one of the main interpretations of Aristotle's theory of the intellect, which was debated throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It continues to be an important text for the reconstruction of Aristotle's philosophical psychology today.

"'The universe is, as it were, one machine, wherein the celestial spheres are analogous to the interlocking wheels and the particular beings are like the things moved by the wheels' and all events are determined by an inescapable necessity. To speak of free choice or self determination is only an illusion we human beings cherish. Thus writes Theodore the engineer to his old friend Proclus. Proclus' reply is one of the most remarkable discussions on fate, providence and free choice in Late Antiquity. It continues a long debate that had started with the first polemics of the Platonists against the Stoic doctrine of determinism. How can there be place for free choice and moral responsibility in a world governed by an unalterable fate? Not with standing its great interest, Proclus' treatise has not received the attention it deserves, probably because its text is not very accessible to the modern reader. It has survived only in a Latin medieval translation. This first English translation will bring the arguments he formulates again to the fore."--Bloomsbury Publishing The universe is, as it were, one machine, wherein the celestial spheres are analogous to the interlocking wheels and the particular beings are like the things moved by the wheels' and all events are determined by an inescapable necessity. To speak of free choice or self determination is only an illusion we human beings cherish. Thus writes Theodore the engineer to his old friend Proclus. Proclus' reply is one of the most remarkable discussions on fate, providence and free choice in Late Antiquity. It continues a long debate that had started with the first polemics of the Platonists against the Stoic doctrine of determinism. How can there be place for free choice and moral responsibility in a world governed by an unalterable fate? Notwithstanding its great interest, Proclus' treatise has not received the attention it deserves, probably because the text survived only in a Latin medieval translation and, in its original language, is not very accessible to the modern reader. This volume, the first English translation of the work, redresses this problem and once again brings the arguments he formulates to the fore.

Philoponus' treatise Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, an attack on Aristotle's astronomy and theology is concerned mainly with the eternity and divinity of the fifth element, or 'quintessence', of which Aristotle took the stars to be composed. Pagans and Christians were divided on whether the world had a beginning, and on whether a belief that the heavens were divine was a mark of religion. Philoponus claimed on behalf of Christianity that the universe was not eternal. His most spectacular arguments, where wrung paradox out of the pagan belief in an infinite past, have been wrongly credited by historians of science to a period 700 years later. The treatise was to influence Islamic, Jewish, Byzantine and Latin thought, though the fifth element was defended against Philoponus even beyond the time of Copernicus. The influence of the treatise was not easy to trace before the fragments were assembled. Dr. Wildberg has brought them together for the first time and provided a summary which makes coherent sense of the whole. He has also studied a Syriac fragment, which reveals that the treatise originally contained an explicitly theological section on the Christian expectation of a new heaven and a new earth.

This book is about determinisism. It contains the two most important commentaries on the determinists' sea battle argument, and on other deterministic arguments besides. It includes the earliest full exposition of the Reaper argument for determinism, and a discussion of whether there can be changeless knowledge of the passage of time. It also contains the two fullest expositions of the idea that it is not truth, but only definite truth, that would imply determinism. Ammonius and Boethius both wrote commentaries on Aristotle's On Interpretation and on its ninth chapter, where Aristotle discusses the sea battle. Their comments are crucial, for Ammonius' commentary influenced the Islamic the Islamic Middle Ages, while that of Boethius was of equal importance to medieval Latin-speaking philosophers. It was once argued that Boethius was influenced by Ammonius, but these translations are published together in this volume to enable the reader to see clearly that this was not the case. Ammonius draws on the fourth- and fifth-century Neoplatonists lamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus. He arranges his argument around three major deterministic arguments and is our main source for one of them, the Reaper argument, which has hitherto received insufficient attention. Boethius, on the other hand, draws on controversies from 300 years earlier between Stoics and Aristotelians as recorded by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Porphyry. This volume is essential reading for all those with an interest in the history of determinism. Ammonius' commentary on the first eight chapters of Aristotle's On Interpretation has appeared in a previously published volume in this series, translated by David Blank.

"Aristotle believed that the outermost stars are carried round us on a transparent sphere. There are directions in the universe and a preferred direction of rotation. The sun moon and planets are carried on different revolving spheres. The spheres and celestial bodies are composed of an everlasting fifth element, which has none of the ordinary contrary properties like heat and cold which could destroy it, but only the facility for uniform rotation. But this creates problems as to how the heavenly bodies create light, and, in the case of the sun, heat. The topics covered in this part of Simplicius' commentary are the speeds and distances of the stars; that the stars are spherical; why the sun and moon have fewer motions than the other five planets; why the sphere of the fixed stars contains so many stars whereas the other heavenly spheres contain no more than one (Simplicius has a long excursus on planetary theory in his commentary on this chapter); discussion of people's views on the position, motion or rest, shape, and size of the earth; that the earth is a relatively small sphere at rest in the centre of the cosmos."--Bloomsbury Publishing Aristotle believed that the outermost stars are carried round us on a transparent sphere. There are directions in the universe and a preferred direction of rotation. The sun, moon and planets are carried on different revolving spheres. The spheres and celestial bodies are composed of an everlasting fifth element, which has none of the ordinary contrary properties like heat and cold which could destroy it, but only the facility for uniform rotation. But this creates problems as to how the heavenly bodies create light, and, in the case of the sun, heat. The topics covered in this part of Simplicius' commentary are: the speeds and distances of the stars; that the stars are spherical; why the sun and moon have fewer motions than the other five planets; why the sphere of the fixed stars contains so many stars whereas the other heavenly spheres contain no more than one (Simplicius has a long excursus on planetary theory in his commentary on this chapter); discussion of people's views on the position, motion or rest, shape, and size of the earth; that the earth is a relatively small sphere at rest in the centre of the cosmos.

Aristotle's On Interpretation, the centrepiece of his logic, examines the relationship between conflicting pairs of statements. The first eight chapters, analysed in this volume, explain what statements are, starting from their basic components - the words - and working up to the character of opposed affirmations and negations. Ammonius, who in his capacity as Professor at Alexandria from around A.D. 470 taught almost all the great sixth-century commentators, left just this one commentary in his own name, although his lectures on other works of Aristotle have been written up by his pupils, who included Philoponus and Asclepius. His ideas on Aristotle's On Interpretation were derived partly from his own teacher, Proclus, and partly from the great lost commentary of Porphyry. The two most important extant commentaries on On Interpretation, of which this is one (the other being by Boethius), both draw on Porphyry's work, which can be to some extent reconstructed from them.

"This volume completes the translation in this series of Quaestiones attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the leading ancient commentator on Aristotle. The Quaestiones are concerned with physics and metaphysics, psychology and divine providence. They exemplify the process whereby Aristotle's thought came to be organised into 'Aristotelianism' and show how interpretations were influenced by doctrines of Hellenistic philosophy. Some, translated into Arabic and thence into Latin, played a part in the transmission of ancient Greek philosophy to the medieval world. Those interested in Aristotle's psychological views will find this half of Quaestiones particularly valuable. Ten of the problems discussed explicitly involve issues raised in On the Soul, including the unity of apperception and the transition from first to second actuality in the act of contemplation. A further dozen concern problems in physical theory, including infinity, necessity and potentiality. Quaestio 2.21 concerns divine providence and helps supplement our knowledge of Alexander's position based on surviving Arabic fragments of his On Providence."--Bloomsbury Publishing This volume completes the translation in this series of Quaestiones attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the leading ancient commentator on Aristotle. The Quaestiones are concerned with physics and metaphysics, psychology and divine providence. They exemplify the process whereby Aristotle's thought came to be organised into 'Aristotelianism' and show how interpretations were influenced by doctrines of Hellenistic philosophy. Some, translated into Arabic and thence into Latin, played a part in the transmission of ancient Greek philosophy to the medieval world. Those interested in Aristotle's psychological views will find this half of Quaestiones particularly valuable. Ten of the problems discussed explicitly involve issues raised in On the Soul, including the unity of apperception and the transition from first to second actuality in the act of contemplation. A further dozen concern problems in physical theory, including infinity, necessity and potentiality. Quaestio 2.21 concerns divine providence and helps supplement our knowledge of Alexander's position based on surviving Arabic fragments of his On Providence.

"The last 14 chapters of book 1 of Aristotle's 'Prior Analytics' are concerned with the representation in the formal language of syllogistic of propositions and arguments expressed in more or less everyday Greek. In his commentary on those chapters, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias' explains some of Aristotle's more opaque assertions and discusses post-Aristotelian ideas in semantics and the philosophy of language. In doing so he provides an unusual insight into the way in which these disciplines developed in the Hellenistic era. He also shows a more sophisticated understanding of these fields than Aristotle himself, while remaining a staunch defender of Aristotle's emphasis on meaning as opposed to Stoics concern with verbal formulation. In his commentary on the final chapter of book 1 Alexander offers a thorough discussion of Aristotle's distinction between denying that something is, e.g., white and asserting that it is non-white."--Bloomsbury Publishing The last 14 chapters of book 1 of Aristotle's "Prior Analytics" are concerned with the representation in the formal language of syllogistic of propositions and arguments expressed in more or less everyday Greek. In his commentary on those chapters, "Alexander of Aphrodisias" explains some of Aristotle's more opaque assertions and discusses post-Aristotelian ideas in semantics and the philosophy of language. In doing so he provides an unusual insight into the way in which these disciplines developed in the Hellenistic era. He also shows a more sophisticated understanding of these fields than Aristotle himself, while remaining a staunch defender of Aristotle's emphasis on meaning as opposed to Stoics concern with verbal formulation. In his commentary on the final chapter of book 1 Alexander offers a thorough discussion of Aristotle's distinction between denying that something is, for example, white and asserting that it is non-white.

Of John Philoponus' commentary on the Meteorology, only that on chapters 1-9 and 12 of the first book has been preserved. It is translated in this series in two parts, the first covering chapters 1-1.3 (London : Bristol Classical Press, 2011), the second chapters 1.4-9 and 12.

"Until the launch of this series over fifteen years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 ad, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. Over 40 volumes have now appeared in the series, which is planned in some 80 volumes altogether. This text by Philoponus rejects accounts of soul, or as we would say of mind, which define it as moving, as cognitive, or in physical terms. Chapter 3 considers Aristotle's attack on the idea that the soul is in motion. This was an attack partly on his teacher, Plato, since Plato defines the soul as self-moving. Philoponus agrees with Aristotle's attack on the idea that a thing must be in motion in order to cause motion. But he offers what may be Ammonius' interpretation of Plato's apparently physicalistic account of the soul in the Timaeus as symbolic. What we would call the mind-body relation is the subject of Chapter 4. Plato and Aristotle attacked a physicalistic theory of soul, which suggested it was the blend, ratio, or harmonious proportion of ingredients in the body. Philoponus attacked the theory too, but we learn from him that Epicurus had defended it. In Chapter 5, Philoponus endorses Aristotle's rejection of the idea that the soul is particles and of Empedocles' idea that the soul must be made of all four elements in order to know what is made of the same elements. He also rejects, with Aristotle, definitions of the soul as moving or cognitive as ignoring lower forms of life. He finally discusses Aristotle's rejection of Plato's localisation of parts of the soul in parts of the body, but asks if new knowledge of the brain and the nerves do not require some kind of localisation."--Bloomsbury Publishing Until the launch of this series over fifteen years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. This text by Philoponus rejects accounts of soul, or as we would say of mind, which define it as moving, as cognitive, or in physical terms. Chapter 3 considers Aristotle's attack on the idea that the soul is in motion. This was an attack partly on his teacher, Plato, since Plato defines the soul as self-moving. Philoponus agrees with Aristotle's attack on the idea that a thing must be in motion in order to cause motion. But he offers what may be Ammonius' interpretation of Plato's apparently physicalistic account of the soul in the Timaeus as symbolic. What we would call the mind-body relation is the subject of Chapter 4. Plato and Aristotle attacked a physicalistic theory of soul, which suggested it was the blend, ratio, or harmonious proportion of ingredients in the body.Philoponus attacked the theory too, but we learn from him that Epicurus had defended it. In Chapter 5, Philoponus endorses Aristotle's rejection of the idea that the soul is particles and of Empedocles' idea that the soul must be made of all four elements in order to know what is made of the same elements. He also rejects, with Aristotle, definitions of the soul as moving or cognitive as ignoring lower forms of life. He finally discusses Aristotle's rejection of Plato's localisation of parts of the soul in parts of the body, but asks if new knowledge of the brain and the nerves do not require some kind of localisation.

This volume is essential reading for anyone interested in the history of determinism. It contains the two most important commentaries on the determinists' sea battle argument as well as on other deterministic arguments. The book includes the earliest full exposition of the Reaper argument for determinism, a discussion of whether changeless knowledge of the passage of time is possible, and the two fullest expositions of the idea that determinism is implied not by truth, but only by definite truth. Ammonius and Boethius both wrote commentaries on Aristotle's On Interpretation and on its ninth chapter, where Aristotle discusses the sea battle. Their comments are crucial, for Ammonius' commentary influenced the Islamic Middle Ages, while that of Boethius was of equal importance to medieval Latin-speaking philosophers.

The ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle constitute a large body of Greek philosophical writings, not previously translated into European languages. This volume includes notes and indexes and forms part of a series to fill this gap.

"Until the launch of this series over ten years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. Over 30 volumes have now appeared in the series, which is planned in some 60 volumes altogether. In this, one of the most original ancient texts on sense perception, Philoponus, the sixth century AD commentator on Aristotle, considers how far perceptual processes are incorporeal. Colour affects us in the same way as light which, passing through a stained glass window, affects the air, but colours only the masonry beyond. Sounds and smells are somewhat more physical, travelling most of the way to us with a moving block of air, but not quite all the way. Only the organ of touch takes on the tangible qualities perceived, because reception of sensible qualities in perception is cognitive, not physical. Neither light nor the action of colour involves the travel of bodies. Our capacities for psychological activity do not follow, nor result from, the chemistry of our bodies, but merely supervene on that. On the other hand, Philoponus shows knowledge of the sensory nerves, and he believes that thought and anger both warm us. This is used elsewhere to show how we can tell someone else's state of mind."--Bloomsbury Publishing In this, one of the most original ancient texts on sense perception, Philoponus, the sixth century AD commentator on Aristotle, considers how far perceptual processes are incorporeal. Colour affects us in the same way as light which, passing through a stained glass window, affects the air, but colours only the masonry beyond. Sounds and smells are somewhat more physical, travelling most of the way to us with a moving block of air, but not quite all the way. Only the organ of touch takes on the tangible qualities perceived, because reception of sensible qualities in perception is cognitive, not physical. Neither light nor the action of colour involves the travel of bodies. Our capacities for psychological activity do not follow, nor result from, the chemistry of our bodies, but merely supervene on that. On the other hand, Philoponus shows knowledge of the sensory nerves, and he believes that thought and anger both warm us. This argument is used elsewhere to show how we can tell someone else's state of mind.

"In his Physics 4, Aristotle defines place and time and denies the possibility of vacuum. Themistius, whose commentary is translated in this volume, wrote in the fourth century A.D. The fact that his commentaries are called paraphrases should not be allowed to conceal their importance. Some of his ideas are very original and he was taken seriously by later commentators and used as an authority by Aquinas." "Aristotle denies three-dimensional space and substitutes the idea of a thing's place as its immediate surroundings. Themistius supports Aristotle's denial. However, he reveals that the philosopher-doctor Galen, in the late second century A.D., had argued for the reality of space by imagining a bronze jar whose contents shrink, without any other matter coming in to fill the gap. Themistius complains that this thought experiment begs the question by assuming the very spatial extension, or gap, that Galen wants to prove." "Aristotle's conception of place as surroundings makes it problematic how his outermost sphere, which carries the stars, can have any place, given that it has no surroundings. Themistius suggests various solutions, including treating the inner spheres as surroundings." "Turning to time, Themistius again reveals Galen's objections to Aristotle and defends Aristotle from the charge of giving a circular definition of time. On the other hand, Themistius criticizes Aristotle for saying that there would be no time if there were no soul. Most of these points were debated by later commentators."--BOOK JACKET.

"This is a post-Aristotelian Greek philosophical text, written at a crucial moment in the defeat of paganism by Christianity, AD 529, when the Emporor Justinian closed the pagan Neoplatonist school in Athens. Philoponus in Alexandria was a brilliant Christian philosopher, steeped in Neoplatanism, who turned the pagans' ideas against them. Here he attacks the most devout of the earlier Athenian pagan philosophers, Proclus, defending the distinctively Christian view that the universe had a beginning against Proclus' eighteen arguments to the contrary, which are discussed in eighteen chapters. Chapters 1-5 are translated in this volume."--Bloomsbury Publishing This is a post-Aristotelian Greek philosophical text, written at a crucial moment in the defeat of paganism by Christianity, AD 529, when the Emperor Justinian closed the pagan Neoplatonist school in Athens. Philoponus in Alexandria was a brilliant Christian philosopher, steeped in Neoplatanism, who turned the pagans' ideas against them. Here he attacks the most devout of the earlier Athenian pagan philosophers, Proclus, defending the distinctively Christian view that the universe had a beginning against Proclus' eighteen arguments to the contrary, which are discussed in eighteen chapters. Chapters 1-5 are translated in this volume.

This volume offers a new translation of the Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius' commentary on the chapters concerning place and time in Aristotle's Physics, Book Four. Written after the closing of the Athenian Neoplatonist school in A.D. 529, the commentary clarifies the structure and meaning of Aristotle's arguments and provides a rich account of 800 years of interpretation. Surprisingly, in the first five chapters of Book Four Aristotle shows place as two-dimensional: one's place is the two-dimensional inner surface of one's surroundings. He also suggests that the upward motion of air and fire and the downward motion of earth and water are partly explained by the natural places to which they tend. Place thus has power (dunamis) of its own. In his last five chapters, Aristotle argues that if time did not entail change its passage would be undetectable, and that time, by definition countable, requires the existence of conscious beings to do the counting. Among the many relevant views that Simplicius records are those of Galen, who attacks this claim, and of Eudemus, who rebuts the Pythagorean theory that history will repeat itself exactly. J. O. Urmson's translation serves as a companion to his earlier translation of the Corollaries on Place and Time, in which Simplicius sets forth his own views as distinct from those of Aristotle. A major sourcebook for the interpretation of Aristotle, this volume will be welcomed by scholars and students in the fields of classics, ancient philosophy, ancient history, and medieval studies.

"Themistius' treatment of Books 5-8 of Aristotle's Physics shows this commentator's capacity to identify, isolate and discuss the core ideas in Aristotle's account of change, his theory of the continuum, and his doctrine of the unmoved mover. His paraphrase offered his ancient students, as it will now offer his modern readers, an opportunity to encounter central features of Aristotle's physical theory, synthesized and epitomized in a manner that has always marked Aristotelian exegesis but was raised to a new level by the innovative method of focused paraphrase pioneered by Themistius. By taking selective but telling account of the earlier Peripatetic tradition (notably Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias), this commentator creates a framework that can still be profitably used by Aristotelian scholars today."--Jacket.

"In the Corollaries on Place and Void, Philoponus attacks Aristotle's conception of place as two-dimensional, adopting instead the view more familiar to us that it is three-dimensional, inert and conceivable as void. Philoponus' denial that velocity in the void would be infinite anticipated Galileo, as did his denial that speed of fall is proportionate to weight, which Galileo greatly developed. In the second document Simplicius attacks a lost treatise of Philoponus which argued for the Christians against the eternity of the world. He exploits Aristotle's concession that the world contains only finite power. Simplicius' presentation of Philoponus' arguments (which may well be tendentious), together with his replies, tell us a good deal about both Philosophers."--Bloomsbury Publishing In the Corollaries on Place and Void, Philoponus attacks Aristotle's conception of place as two-dimensional, adopting instead the view more familiar to us that it is three-dimensional, inert and conceivable as void. Philoponus' denial that velocity in the void would be infinite anticipated Galileo, as did his denial that speed of fall is proportionate to weight, which Galileo greatly developed. In the second document Simplicius attacks a lost treatise of Philoponus which argued for the Christians against the eternity of the world. He exploits Aristotle's concession that the world contains only finite power. Simplicius' presentation of Philoponus' arguments (which may well be tendentious), together with his replies, tell us a good deal about both Philosophers.

"In his work On Sense Perception, Aristotle discusses the material conditions of perception, starting with the sense organs and moving to the material basis of colour, flavour and odour. His Pythagorean account of hues as a ratio of dark to light was enthusiastically endorsed by Goethe against Newton as being true to the painter's experience. Aristotle finishes with three problems about continuity. First, in what sense are indefinitely small colour patches or colour variations perceptible? Secondly, which perceptible leap discontinuously like light to fill a whole space, which have to reach one point before another; and do observers of the latter perceive the same thing if they are at different distances? Thirdly, how does the central sense permit genuinely simultaneous, rather than staggered, perception of different objects? Alexander's highly explanatory commentary is most expansive on these problems of continuity. His battery of objections to vision involving travel, which would lead to collisions and interference by winds, inspired a tradition of grading the five senses in respect of degrees of immateriality and of intentionality. He also introduces us to paradoxes of Diodorus Cronus about the relations of the smallest perceptible to the largest perceptible size."--Bloomsbury Publishing In his work On Sense Perception, Aristotle discusses the material conditions of perception, starting with the sense organs and moving to the material basis of colour, flavour and odour. His Pythagorean account of hues as a ratio of dark to light was enthusiastically endorsed by Goethe against Newton as being true to the painter's experience. Aristotle finishes with three problems about continuity. First, in what sense are indefinitely small colour patches or colour variations perceptible? Secondly, which perceptible leap discontinuously like light to fill a whole space, which have to reach one point before another; and do observers of the latter perceive the same thing if they are at different distances? Thirdly, how does the central sense permit genuinely simultaneous, rather than staggered, perception of different objects? Alexander's highly explanatory commentary is most expansive on these problems of continuity. His battery of objections to vision involving travel, which would lead to collisions and interference by winds, inspired a tradition of grading the five senses in respect of degrees of immateriality and of intentionality. He also introduces us to paradoxes of Diodorus Cronus about the relations of the smallest perceptible to the largest perceptible size.

"This important commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's work on biochemistry was previously lost. However, four chapters of it have been reidentified in an Arabic translation by Emma Gannge and are here translated for the first time. The chapters were preserved in the writings of an eighth-century alchemist, Jabir ibn Hayyan. In addition to preserving an interesting example of very early cross-cultural scientific activity in the Muslim world, the newly discovered material is of philosophical importance: We learn how Alexander attempted to provide a unified theory that would unite Aristotle's chemistry with his elemental physics. In addition to a translation of the text, this volume includes a detailed introduction demonstrating the authenticity of the work and discussing its contribution to our understanding of ancient science."--Bloomsbury Publishing This important commentary by Alexander of Aphrodisias on Aristotle's work on biochemistry was previously lost. However, four chapters of it have been re-identified in an Arabic translation by Emma Gannage and are here translated for the first time. The chapters were preserved in the writings of an eighth-century alchemist, Jabir ibn Hayyan. In addition to preserving an interesting example of very early cross-cultural scientific activity in the Muslim world, the newly discovered material is of philosophical importance: We learn how Alexander attempted to provide a unified theory that would unite Aristotle's chemistry with his elemental physics. As well as an English translation of the text, this volume includes a detailed introduction demonstrating the authenticity of the work and discussing its contribution to our understanding of ancient science.

"Is there such a thing as three-dimensional space? Is space inert or dynamic? Is the division of time into past, present and future real? Does the whole of time exist all at once? Does it progress smoothly or by discontinuous leaps? Simplicius surveys ideas about place and time from the preceding thousand years of Greek Philosophy and reveals the extraordinary ingenuity of the late Neoplatonist theories, which he regards as marking a substantial advance on all previous ideas."--Bloomsbury Publishing Is there such a thing as three-dimensional space? Is space inert or dynamic? Is the division of time into past, present and future real? Does the whole of time exist all at once? Does it progress smoothly or by discontinuous leaps? Simplicius surveys ideas about place and time from the preceding thousand years of Greek Philosophy and reveals the extraordinary ingenuity of the late Neoplatonist theories, which he regards as marking a substantial advance on all previous ideas.

"Until the launch of this series over fifteen years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 ad, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. Over 40 volumes have now appeared in the series, which is planned in some 80 volumes altogether. In this, the first half of Philoponus' analysis of book one of Aristotle's Physics, the principal themes are metaphysical. Aristotle's opening chapter in the Physics is an abstract reflection on methodology for the investigation of nature, 'physics'. Aristotle suggests that one must proceed from things that are familiar but vague, and derive more precise but less obvious principles to constitute genuine knowledge. His controversial claim that this is to progress from the universal to the more particular occasions extensive apologetic exegesis, typical of Philoponus' meticulous and somewhat pedantic method. Philoponus explains away the apparent conflict between the 'didactic method' (unavoidable in physics) and the strict demonstrative method described in the Analytics. After 20 pages on chapter 1, Philoponus devotes the remaining 66 pages to Aristotle's objections to two major Presocratic thinkers, Parmenides and Melissus. Aristotle included these thinkers as an aside, because they were not engaged in physics, but in questioning the very basis of physics. Philoponus investigates Aristotle's claims about the relation between a science and its axioms, explores alternative ways of formalising Aristotle's refutation of Eleatic monism and provides a sustained critique of Aristotle's analysis of the Eleatics' purported mistakes about unity and being."--Bloomsbury Publishing Until the launch of this series over fifteen years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. In this, the first half of Philoponus' analysis of book one of Aristotle's Physics, the principal themes are metaphysical. Aristotle's opening chapter in the Physics is an abstract reflection on methodology for the investigation of nature, or 'physics'. Aristotle suggests that one must proceed from things that are familiar but vague, and derive more precise but less obvious principles to constitute genuine knowledge. His controversial claim that this is to progress from the universal to the more particular occasions extensive apologetic exegesis, typical of Philoponus' meticulous and somewhat pedantic method. Philoponus explains away the apparent conflict between the 'didactic method' (unavoidable in physics) and the strict demonstrative method described in the Analytics. After 20 pages on Chapter 1, Philoponus devotes the remaining 66 pages to Aristotle's objections to two major Presocratic thinkers, Parmenides and Melissus. Aristotle included these thinkers as an aside, because they were not engaged in physics, but in questioning the very basis of physics. Philoponus investigates Aristotle's claims about the relation between a science and its axioms, explores alternative ways of formalising Aristotle's refutation of Eleatic monism and provides a sustained critique of Aristotle's analysis of the Eleatics' purported mistakes about unity and being.

"The Supplement transmitted as the second book of On the Soul by Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200 AD) is a collection of short texts on a wide range of topics from psychology, including the general hylomorphic account of soul and its faculties, and the theory of vision; questions in ethics (natural instincts, the unity of the virtues, the naturalness of justice and the insufficiency of virtue for happiness); and issues relating to responsibility, chance and fate. One of the texts in the collection, On Intellect, had a major influence on medieval Arabic and Western thought, greater than that of Alexander's On the Soul itself. The treatises may all be by Alexander himself; certainly the majority of them are closely connected with his other works. Many of them, however, consist of collections of arguments on particular issues, collections which probably incorporate material from earlier in the history of the Peripatetic school. This translation is from a new edition of the Greek text based on a collation of all known manuscripts and comparison with medieval Arabic and Latin translations."--Bloomsbury Publishing The Supplement transmitted as the second book of On the Soul by Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200 AD) is a collection of short texts on a wide range of topics from psychology, including the general hylomorphic account of soul and its faculties, and the theory of vision; questions in ethics (natural instincts, the unity of the virtues, the naturalness of justice and the insufficiency of virtue for happiness); and issues relating to responsibility, chance and fate. One of the texts in the collection, On Intellect, had a major influence on medieval Arabic and Western thought, greater than that of Alexander's On the Soul itself. The treatises may all be by Alexander himself; certainly the majority of them are closely connected with his other works. Many of them, however, consist of collections of arguments on particular issues, collections which probably incorporate material from earlier in the history of the Peripatetic school. This translation is from a new edition of the Greek text based on a collation of all known manuscripts and comparison with medieval Arabic and Latin translations.

"This text by Philoponus, the sixth-century commentator on Aristotle, is notable for its very informative Introduction to Psychology, which tells us the views of Philoponus, of his teacher and of later Neoplatonists on our psychological capacities and on mind-body relations. There is an unusual account of how reason can infer a universally valid conclusion from a single instance, and there are inherited views on the roles of intellect and perception in concept formation, and on the human ability to make reasoned decisions, celebrated by Aristotle, but here downgraded. Philoponus attacks Galen's view that psychological capacities follow, or result from, bodily chemistry; they merely supervene on that and can be counteracted. He has benefited from Galen's knowledge of the brain and nerves, but also propounds the Neoplatonist belief in tenuous bodies which after death support our irrational souls temporarily, or our reason eternally."--Bloomsbury Publishing This text by Philoponus, the sixth-century commentator on Aristotle, is notable for its informative introduction to psychology, which tells us the views of Philoponus, of his teacher and of later Neoplatonists on our psychological capacities and on mind-body relations. There is an unusual account of how reason can infer a universally valid conclusion from a single instance, and there are inherited views on the roles of intellect and perception in concept formation, and on the human ability to make reasoned decisions, celebrated by Aristotle, but here downgraded. Philoponus attacks Galen's view that psychological capacities follow, or result from, bodily chemistry; they merely supervene on that and can be counteracted. He has benefited from Galen's knowledge of the brain and nerves, but also propounds the Neoplatonist belief in tenuous bodies which after death support our irrational souls temporarily, or our reason eternally.

"Book 7 of Aristotle's Physics - once regarded as merely an undeveloped early version of Book 8 - has recently attracted renewed interest. Differences of opinion concerning its importance are as old as Aristotle's text, and Simplicius' commentary, written in the sixth century A.D., is an indispensable tool for understanding Book 7. Charles Hagen here gives the English reader access to this commentary for the first time." "Among the most important aspects of the commentary are Simplicius' explanation of the interconnections among the chapters of Book 7 and his references to a more extensive second version of Aristotle's text than the one that survives today. Acknowledging that Book 8 offers a more precise discussion of the subject covered in Book 7, the case for a prime mover, Simplicius both identifies ways in which Book 7 reveals Aristotle's acumen and clarifies its relationship to the other books in the Physics."--BOOK JACKET.

"Aristotle argues in On the Heavens 1.5-7 that there can be no infinitely large body, and in 1.8-9 that there cannot be more than one physical world. As a corollary in 1.9, he infers that there is no place, vacuum or time beyond the outermost stars. As one argument in favour of a single world, he argues that his four elements, earth, air, fire and water, have only one natural destination apiece. Moreover they accelerate as they approach it and acceleration cannot be unlimited. However, the Neoplatonist Simplicius, who wrote the commentary translated here in the sixth century AD, tells us that this whole world view was to be rejected by Strato, the third head of Aristotle's school. At the same time, he tells us the different theories of acceleration in Greek philosophy."--Bloomsbury Publishing Aristotle argues in On the Heavens 1.5-7 that there can be no infinitely large body, and in 1.8-9 that there cannot be more than one physical world. As a corollary in 1.9, he infers that there is no place, vacuum or time beyond the outermost stars. As one argument in favour of a single world, he argues that his four elements: earth, air, fire and water, have only one natural destination apiece. Moreover they accelerate as they approach it and acceleration cannot be unlimited. However, the Neoplatonist Simplicius, who wrote the commentary in the sixth century AD (here translated into English), tells us that this whole world view was to be rejected by Strato, the third head of Aristotle's school. At the same time, he tells us the different theories of acceleration in Greek philosophy.

Simplicius' On Aristotle's "On the Soul 1.1-2.4" is a major source for late Neoplatonist theories of thought and sense perception and offers considerable insight into an important area of Aristotelian philosophy. The present volume is the only English translation of the commentary and affords its readers the opportunity to consider the question of its disputed authorship. While most scholars attribute authorship of On Aristotle's "On the Soul 1.1-2.4" to Simplicius, some have judged it to be the work of Priscian, or of another philosopher. The commentary discusses the first half of On the Soul, which comprises Aristotle's survey of his predecessors' views, as well as his own account of the nature of the soul.

"Until the launch of this series over fifteen years ago, the 15,000 volumes of the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, written mainly between 200 and 600 AD, constituted the largest corpus of extant Greek philosophical writings not translated into English or other European languages. Over 40 volumes have now appeared in the series, which is planned in some 80 volumes altogether. In chapters 12-18 of Against Proclus, Philoponus continues to do battle against Proclus' arguments for the beginninglessness and everlastingness of the ordered universe. In this final section there are three notable issues under discussion. The first concerns the composition of the heavens and its manner of movement. Philoponus argues against the Aristotelian thesis that there is a fifth heavenly body that has a natural circular motion. He concludes that even though the celestial region is composed of fire and the other three elements, it can move in a circle by the agency of its soul, and that this circular motion is not compromised in any way by the innate natural motion of the fire. Chapter 16 contains an extended discussion of the will of God and His relation to particulars. Here Philoponus addresses issues that become central to medieval philosophical and theological discussions, including the unity, timelessness and indivisibility of God's will. Finally, throughout these seven chapters Philoponus is engaged in a detailed exegesis of Plato's Timaeus which aims to settle a number of familiar interpretive problems, notably how we should properly understand the pre-cosmic state of disorderly motion, and the statement that the visible cosmos is an image of the paradigm. Philoponus' exegetical concerns culminate in chapter 18 with an extensive discussion of Plato's attitude to poetry and myth."--Bloomsbury Publishing In chapters 12-18 of Against Proclus, Philoponus continues to do battle against Proclus' arguments for the beginninglessness and everlastingness of the ordered universe. In this final section there are three notable issues under discussion. The first concerns the composition of the heavens and its manner of movement. Philoponus argues against the Aristotelian thesis that there is a fifth heavenly body that has a natural circular motion. He concludes that even though the celestial region is composed of fire and the other three elements, it can move in a circle by the agency of its soul, and that this circular motion is not compromised in any way by the innate natural motion of the fire.Chapter 16 contains an extended discussion of the will of God and His relation to particulars. Here Philoponus addresses issues that become central to medieval philosophical and theological discussions, including the unity, timelessness and indivisibility of God's will. Finally, throughout these seven chapters Philoponus is engaged in a detailed exegesis of Plato's Timaeus which aims to settle a number of familiar interpretive problems, notably how we should understand the pre-cosmic state of disorderly motion, and the statement that the visible cosmos is an image of the paradigm. Philoponus' exegetical concerns culminate in chapter 18 with an extensive discussion of Plato's attitude to poetry and myth.

"Simplicius, the greatest surviving ancient authority on Aristotle's Physics, lived in the sixth century A. D. He produced detailed commentaries on several of Aristotle's works. Those on the Physics, which alone come to over 1,300 pages in the original Greek, preserve a centuries-old tradition of ancient scholarship on Aristotle. In Physics Book 5 Aristotle lays down some of the principles of his dynamics and theory of change. What does not count as change: change of relation? The flux of time? There is no change of change, yet acceleration is recognised. Aristotle defines 'continuous', 'contact' and 'next', and uses these definitions in discussing when we can claim that the same change or event is still going on. This volume is complemented by David Konstan's translation of Simplicius' commentary on Physics Book 6, which has already appeared in this series. It is Book 6 that gives spatial application to the terms defined in Book 5, and uses them to mount a celebrated attack on atomism. Simplicius' commentaries enrich our understanding of the Physics and of its interpretation in the ancient world."--Bloomsbury Publishing Simplicius, the greatest surviving ancient authority on Aristotle's Physics , lived in the sixth century A. D. He produced detailed commentaries on several of Aristotle's works. Those on the Physics, which alone come to over 1,300 pages in the original Greek, preserve a centuries-old tradition of ancient scholarship on Aristotle. In Physics Book 5 Aristotle lays down some of the principles of his dynamics and theory of change. What does not count as change: change of relation? The flux of time? There is no change of change, yet acceleration is recognised. Aristotle defines 'continuous', 'contact' and 'next', and uses these definitions in discussing when we can claim that the same change or event is still going on. This volume is complemented by David Konstan's translation of Simplicius' commentary on Physics Book 6, which has already appeared in this series. It is Book 6 that gives spatial application to the terms defined in Book 5, and uses them to mount a celebrated attack on atomism. Simplicius' commentaries enrich our understanding of the Physics and of its interpretation in the ancient world.

"Aristotle's Physics Book 3 covers two subjects: the definition of change and the finitude of the universe. Change enters into the very definition of nature as an internal source of change. Change receives two definitions in chapters 1 and 2, as involving the actualisation of the potential or of the changeable. Alexander of Aphrodisias is reported as thinking that the second version is designed to show that Book 3, like Book 5, means to disqualify change in relations from being genuine change. Aristotle's successor Theophrastus, we are told, and Simplicius himself, prefer to admit relational change. Chapter 3 introduces a general causal principle that the activity of the agent causing change is in the patient undergoing change, and that the causing and undergoing are to be counted as only one activity, however different in definition. Simplicius points out that this paves the way for Aristotle's God who moves the heavens, while admitting no motion in himself. It is also the basis of Aristotle's doctrine, central to Neoplatonism, that intellect is one with the objects it contemplates.In defending Aristotle's claim that the universe is spatially finite, Simplicius has to meet Archytas' question, "What happens at the edge?". He replies that, given Aristotle's definition of place, there is nothing, rather than an empty place, beyond the furthest stars, and one cannot stretch one's hand into nothing, nor be prevented by nothing. But why is Aristotle's beginningless universe not temporally infinite? Simplicius answers that the past years no longer exist, so one never has an infinite collection."--Bloomsbury Publishing Aristotle's Physics Book 3 covers two subjects: the definition of change and the finitude of the universe. Change enters into the very definition of nature as an internal source of change. Change receives two definitions in chapters 1 and 2, as involving the actualisation of the potential or of the changeable. Alexander of Aphrodisias is reported as thinking that the second version is designed to show that Book 3, like Book 5, means to disqualify change in relations from being genuine change. Aristotle's successor Theophrastus, we are told, and Simplicius himself, prefer to admit relational change. Chapter 3 introduces a general causal principle that the activity of the agent causing change is in the patient undergoing change, and that the causing and undergoing are to be counted as only one activity, however different in definition. Simplicius points out that this paves the way for Aristotle's God who moves the heavens, while admitting no motion in himself. It is also the basis of Aristotle's doctrine, central to Neoplatonism, that intellect is one with the objects it contemplates.In defending Aristotle's claim that the universe is spatially finite, Simplicius has to meet Archytas' question, "What happens at the edge?". He replies that, given Aristotle's definition of place, there is nothing, rather than an empty place, beyond the furthest stars, and one cannot stretch one's hand into nothing, nor be prevented by nothing. But why is Aristotle's beginningless universe not temporally infinite? Simplicius answers that the past years no longer exist, so one never has an infinite collection.

"Chapters 5 and 6 of Aristotle's Categories describe his first two categories, Substance and Quantity. It is usually taken that Plotinus attacked Aristotle's Categories, but that Porphyry and Iamblichus restored it to the curriculum once and for all. Nonetheless, the introduction to this text stresses how much of the defence of Aristotle Porphyry was able to draw out of Plotinus' critical discussion. Simplicius' commentary is our most comprehensive account of the debate on the validity of Aristotle's Categories. One subject discussed by Simplicius in these chapters is where the differentia of a species (eg the rationality of humans) fits into the scheme of categories. Another is why Aristotle elevates the category of Quantity to second place, above the category of Quality. Further, de Haas shows how Simplicius distinguishes different kinds of universal order to solve some of the problems."--Bloomsbury Publishing Chapters 5 and 6 of Aristotle's Categories describe his first two categories, Substance and Quantity. It is usually taken that Plotinus attacked Aristotle's Categories, but that Porphyry and Iamblichus restored it to the curriculum once and for all. Nonetheless, the introduction to this text stresses how much of the defence of Aristotle Porphyry was able to draw out of Plotinus' critical discussion. Simplicius' commentary is our most comprehensive account of the debate on the validity of Aristotle's Categories. One subject discussed by Simplicius in these chapters is where the differentia of a species (eg the rationality of humans) fits into the scheme of categories. Another is why Aristotle elevates the category of Quantity to second place, above the category of Quality. Further, de Haas shows how Simplicius distinguishes different kinds of universal order to solve some of the problems.

"Aristotle's Topics is about dialectic, which can be understood as a debate between two people or as an individual's internal debate. Its purposes range from philosophical training to discovering the first principles of thought. Its arguments concern the four predicables: definition, property, genus, and accident. Aristotle explains how these four fit into his ten categories and in Book 1 begins to outline strategies for debate, such as the definition of ambiguity.". "Alexander's commentary on Book 1 concerns the definition of Aristotelian syllogistic argument; its resistance to the rival Stoic theory of inference; and the character of inductive inference and of rhetorical argument. Alexander distinguishes inseparable accidents, such as the whiteness of snow, from defining differentiae, such as its being frozen, and considers how these differences fit into the schemes of categories. He speaks of dialectic as a stochastic discipline in which success is to be judged not by victory but by skill in argument. Alexander also investigates the subject of ambiguity, which had been richly developed since Aristotle by the rival Stoic school."--BOOK JACKET.

The commentary attributed to Simplicius on Aristotle's On the Soul appears in this series in three volumes, of which this is the first. The translation provides the first opportunity for a wider readership to assess the disputed question of authorship. Is the work by Simplicius, or by his colleague Priscian, or by another commentator? In the second volume, Priscian's Paraphrase of Theophrastus on Sense Perception, which covers the same subject, will also be translated for comparison. Whatever its authorship, the commentary is a major source for late Neoplatonist theories of thought and sense perception and provides considerable insight into this important area of Aristotle's thought. In this first volume, the Neoplatonist commentator covers the first half of Aristotle's On the Soul, comprising Aristotle's survey of his predecessors and his own rival account of the nature of the soul.

"Themistius' treatment of Books 1-3 of Aristotle's Physics presents central features of Aristotle's thought about principles, causation, change and infinity. The tradition of synthesising and epitomising exegesis is here raised to a new level by the innovative method of paraphrase pioneered by Themistius. Taking selective, but telling, account of the earlier Peripatetic and Presocratic tradition, Themistius creates a framework that can still be profitably used in the study of Aristotle. This book will be of interest to all students of ancient and medieval philosophy, history and philosophy of science."--Bloomsbury Publishing Themistius' treatment of Books 1-3 of Aristotle's Physics presents central features of Aristotle's thought about principles, causation, change and infinity. The tradition of synthesising and epitomising exegesis is here raised to a new level by the innovative method of paraphrase pioneered by Themistius. Taking a selective, but telling, account of the earlier Peripatetic and Presocratic tradition, Themistius creates a framework that can still be profitably used in the study of Aristotle. This volume contains the first English translation of Themistius' commentary, accompanied by a detailed introduction, extensive explanatory notes and a bibliography.

"Simplicius, the greatest surviving ancient authority on Aristotle's Physics, lived in the sixth century A.D. He produced detailed commentaries on several of Aristotle's works. Those on the Physics, which alone come to over 1,300 pages in the original Greek, preserve a centuries-old tradition of ancient scholarship on Aristotle. In Physics Book 5 Aristotle lays down some of the principles of his dynamics and theory of change. What does not count as a change: change of relation? the flux of time? There is no change of change, yet acceleration is recognised. Aristotle defines 'continuous', 'contact', and 'next', and uses these definitions in discussing when we can claim that the same change or event is still going on."-- Publisher description.

"This companion to J. O. Urmson's translation in the same series of Simplicius' Corollaries on Place and Time contains Simplicius' commentary on the chapters on place and time in Aristotle's Physics book 4. It is a rich source for the preceding 800 years' discussion of Aristotle's views. Simplicius records attacks on Aristotle's claim that time requires change, or consciousness. He reports a rebuttal of the Pythagorean theory that history will repeat itself exactly. He evaluates Aristotle's treatment of Zeno's paradox concerning place. Throughout he elucidates the structure and meaning of Aristotle's arguement, and all the more clearly for having separated off his own views into the Corollaries."--Bloomsbury Publishing This companion to J. O. Urmson's translation in the same series of Simplicius' Corollaries on Place and Time contains Simplicius' commentary on the chapters on place and time in Aristotle's Physics book 4. It is a rich source for the preceding 800 years' discussion of Aristotle's views. Simplicius records attacks on Aristotle's claim that time requires change, or consciousness. He reports a rebuttal of the Pythagorean theory that history will repeat itself exactly. He evaluates Aristotle's treatment of Zeno's paradox concerning place. Throughout he elucidates the structure and meaning of Aristotle's argument, and all the more clearly for having separated off his own views into the Corollaries.

"Aristotle's Physics is about the causes of motion and culminates in a proof that God is needed as the ultimate cause of motion. Aristotle argues that things in motion need to be moved by something other than themselves -- he rejects Plato's self-movers. On pain of regress, there must be an unmoved mover. If this unmoved mover is to cause motion eternally, it needs infinite power. It cannot, then, be a body, since bodies, being of finite size, cannot house infinite power. The unmoved mover is therefore an incorporeal God. Simplicius reveals that his teacher, Ammonius, harmonised Aristotle with Plato to counter Christian charges of pagan disagreement, by making Aristotle's God a cause of beginningless movement, but of beginningless existence of the universe. Eternal existence, not less than eternal motion, calls for an infinite, and hence incorporeal, force. By an irony, this anti-Christian interpretation turned Aristotle's God from a thinker into a certain kind of Creator, and so helped to make Aristotle's God acceptable to St Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. This text provides a translation of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's work."--Bloomsbury Publishing Aristotle's Physics is about the causes of motion and culminates in a proof that God is needed as the ultimate cause of motion. Aristotle argues that things in motion need to be moved by something other than themselves - he rejects Plato's self-movers. On pain of regress, there must be an unmoved mover. If this unmoved mover is to cause motion eternally, it needs infinite power. It cannot, then, be a body, since bodies, being of finite size, cannot house infinite power. The unmoved mover is therefore an incorporeal God. Simplicius reveals that his teacher, Ammonius, harmonised Aristotle with Plato to counter Christian charges of pagan disagreement, by making Aristotle's God a cause of beginningless movement, but of beginningless existence of the universe. Eternal existence, not less than eternal motion, calls for an infinite, and hence incorporeal, force. By an irony, this anti-Christian interpretation turned Aristotle's God from a thinker into a certain kind of Creator, and so helped to make Aristotle's God acceptable to St Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. This text provides a translation of Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's work.

"Aristotle classified the things in the world into ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relative, etc. Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, attacked the classification, accepting only these first four categories, rejecting the other six, and adding one of this own: change. He preferred Plato's classification into five kinds which included change. In this part of his commentary, Simplicius records the controversy on the six categories which Plotinus rejected: acting, being acted upon, being in a position, when, where, and having on. Plotinus' pupil and editor, Porphyry, defended all six categories as applicable to the physical world, even if not to the world of Platonic Forms to which Platonist studies must eventually progress. Porphyry's pupil, lamblichus, went further: taken in a suitable sense, Aristotle's categories apply also to the world of Forms, although they require Pythagorean reinterpretation. Simplicius may be closer to Porphyry that to lamblichus, and indeed Porphyry's defence established Aristotle's categories once and for all in Western thought. But the probing controversy of this period none the less revealed more effectively than any discussion of modern times the profound difficulties in Aristotle's categorical scheme."--Bloomsbury Publishing Aristotle classified the things in the world into ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relative, etc. Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, attacked the classification, accepting only these first four categories, rejecting the other six, and adding one of this own: change. He preferred Plato's classification into five kinds which included change. In this part of his commentary, Simplicius records the controversy on the six categories which Plotinus rejected: acting, being acted upon, being in a position, when, where, and having on. Plotinus' pupil and editor, Porphyry, defended all six categories as applicable to the physical world, even if not to the world of Platonic Forms to which Platonist studies must eventually progress. Porphyry's pupil, lamblichus, went further: taken in a suitable sense, Aristotle's categories apply also to the world of Forms, although they require Pythagorean reinterpretation. Simplicius may be closer to Porphyry that to lamblichus, and indeed Porphyry's defence established Aristotle's categories once and for all in Western thought. But the probing controversy of this period none the less revealed more effectively than any discussion of modern times the profound difficulties in Aristotle's categorical scheme.

"In the second half of Book One of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle reflects on the application of the formalized logic has developed in the first half, focusing particularly on the non-modal or assertoric syllogistic developed in the first seven chapters. These reflections lead Alexander of Aphrodisias, who was a great exponent of Aristotelianism in the late second century, to explain and sometimes argue against subsequent developments of Aristotle's logic and alternatives and objections to it, ideas associated mainly with his colleague Theophrastus and with the Stoics." "The other main topic of this part of the Prior Analytics is the specification of a method for discovering true premises needed to prove a given proposition. Aristotle's presentation is sometimes difficult to follow, and Alexander's discussion is extremely helpful to the uninitiated reader. In his commentary on the final chapter translated in this volume, Alexander provides an insightful account of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's method of division."--Jacket.

"Aristotle's Topics is about dialectic, which can be understood as a debate between two people or the inner debate of one thinker with himself. Its purposes range from philosophical training to discovering the first principles of thought. Its arguments concern the four predicables (definition, property, genus and accident). Aristotle explains how these four fit into his ten categories, and in Book 1 begins to outline strategies for debate, such as the definition of ambiguity. Alexander's commentary on Book 1 discusses how to define Aristotelian syllogistic argument, why it stands up against the rival Stoic theory of interference, and what is the character of inductive interference and of rhetorical argument. He distinguishes inseparable accidents such as the whiteness of snow from defining differentiae such as its being frozen, and considers how these fit into the scheme of categories. He speaks of dialectic as a stochastic discipline in which success is to be judged not by victory but by skill in argument, a view parallel to that sometimes taken in antiquity of medical practice. And he investigates the subject of ambiguity which had also been richly developed since Aristotle by the rival Stoic school."--Bloomsbury Publishing Aristotle's Topics is about dialectic, which can be understood as a debate between two people or the inner debate of one thinker with himself. Its purposes range from philosophical training to discovering the first principles of thought. Its arguments concern the four predicables (definition, property, genus and accident). Aristotle explains how these four fit into his ten categories, and in Book 1 begins to outline strategies for debate, such as the definition of ambiguity. Alexander's commentary on Book 1 discusses how to define Aristotelian syllogistic argument, why it stands up against the rival Stoic theory of interference, and what is the character of inductive interference and of rhetorical argument. He distinguishes inseparable accidents such as the whiteness of snow from defining differentiae such as its being frozen, and considers how these fit into the scheme of categories. He speaks of dialectic as a stochastic discipline in which success is to be judged not by victory but by skill in argument, a view parallel to that sometimes taken in antiquity of medical practice. And he investigates the subject of ambiguity which had also been richly developed since Aristotle by the rival Stoic school.

"In On the Soul 3.1-5, Aristotle goes beyond the five sense to the general functions of sense perception, the imagination and the so-called active intellect, the of which was still a matter of controversy in the time of Thomas Aquinas. In his commentary on Aristotle's text, 'Simplicius' insists that the intellect in question is not something transcendental but the human rational soul. He denies both Plotinus' view that a part of the soul has never descended from uninterrupted contemplation of the Platonic Forms, and Proclus' view that the soul cannot be changed in its substance through embodiment. He also denies that imagination sees things as true or false, which requires awareness of one's own cognitions. He thinks that imagination works by projecting imprints. In the case of mathematics, it can make the imprints more like shapes taken on during sense perception or more like concepts, which calls for lines without breadth. He acknowledges that Aristotle would not agree to reify these concepts as substances, but thinks of mathematical entities as mere abstractions. Addressing the vexed question of authorship, H. J. Blumenthal concludes that the commentary was written neither by Simplicius nor Priscian. In a novel interpretation, he suggests that if Priscian had any hand in this commentary, it might have been as editor of notes from Simplicius' lectures."--Bloomsbury Publishing In On the Soul 3.1-5, Aristotle goes beyond the five sense to the general functions of sense perception, the imagination and the so-called active intellect, the of which was still a matter of controversy in the time of Thomas Aquinas. In his commentary on Aristotle's text, 'Simplicius' insists that the intellect in question is not something transcendental but the human rational soul. He denies both Plotinus' view that a part of the soul has never descended from uninterrupted contemplation of the Platonic Forms, and Proclus' view that the soul cannot be changed in its substance through embodiment. He also denies that imagination sees things as true or false, which requires awareness of one's own cognitions. He thinks that imagination works by projecting imprints. In the case of mathematics, it can make the imprints more like shapes taken on during sense perception or more like concepts, which calls for lines without breadth. He acknowledges that Aristotle would not agree to reify these concepts as substances, but thinks of mathematical entities as mere abstractions. Addressing the vexed question of authorship, H. J. Blumenthal concludes that the commentary was written neither by Simplicius nor Priscian. In a novel interpretation, he suggests that if Priscian had any hand in this commentary, it might have been as editor of notes from Simplicius' lectures.

"There has recently been considerable renewed interest in Book 7 of the Physics of Aristotle, once regarded as merely an undeveloped forerunner to Book 8. The debate surrounding the importance of the text is not new to modern scholarship: for example, in the fourth century BC Eudemus, the Peripatetic philosopher associate of Aristotle, left it out of his treatment of the Physics. Now, for the first time, Charles Hagen's lucid translation gives the English reader access to Simplicius' commentary on Book 7, an indispensable tool for the understanding of the text. Its particular interest lies in its explanation of how the chapters of Book 7 fit together and its reference to a more extensive second version of Aristotle's text than the one which survives today."--Bloomsbury Publishing There has recently been considerable renewed interest in Book 7 of the Physics of Aristotle, once regarded as merely an undeveloped forerunner to Book 8. The debate surrounding the importance of the text is not new to modern scholarship: for example, in the fourth century BC Eudemus, the Peripatetic philosopher associate of Aristotle, left it out of his treatment of the Physics. Now, for the first time, Charles Hagen's lucid translation gives the English reader access to Simplicius' commentary on Book 7, an indispensable tool for the understanding of the text. Its particular interest lies in its explanation of how the chapters of Book 7 fit together and its reference to a more extensive second version of Aristotle's text than the one which survives today.

"In his commentary on a portion of Aristotle's de Anima (On the Soul) known as de Intellectu (On the Intellect), Philoponus drew on both Christian and Neoplatonic traditions as he reinterpreted Aristotle's views on such key questions as the immortality of the soul, the role of images in thought, the character of sense perception and the presence within the soul of universals. Although it is one of the richest and most interesting of the ancient works on Aristotle, Philoponus' commentary has survived only in William of Moerbeke's thirteenth-century Latin translation from a partly indecipherable Greek manuscript. The present version, the first translation into English, is based upon William Charlton's penetrating scholarly analysis of Moerbeke's text."--Bloomsbury Publishing In his commentary on a portion of Aristotle's de Anima (On the Soul) known as de Intellectu (On the Intellect), Philoponus drew on both Christian and Neoplatonic traditions as he reinterpreted Aristotle's views on such key questions as the immortality of the soul, the role of images in thought, the character of sense perception and the presence within the soul of universals. Although it is one of the richest and most interesting of the ancient works on Aristotle, Philoponus' commentary has survived only in William of Moerbeke's thirteenth-century Latin translation from a partly indecipherable Greek manuscript. The present version, the first translation into English, is based upon William Charlton's penetrating scholarly analysis of Moerbeke's text.

"In chapter 1 of On the Heavens Aristotle defines body, and then notoriously ruptures dynamics by introducing a fifth element, beyond Plato's four, to explain the rotation of the heavens, which, like nearly all Greeks, Aristotle took to be real, not apparent. Even a member of his school, Xenarchus, we are told, rejected his fifth element. The Neoplatonist Simplicius seeks to harmonise Plato and Aristotle. Plato, he says, thought that the heavens were composed of all four elements but with the purest kind of fire, namely light, predominating. That Plato would not mind this being called a fifth element is shown by his associating with the heavens the fifth of the five convex regular solids recognised by geometry. Simplicius follows Aristotle's view that one of the lower elements, fire, also rotates, as shown by the behaviour of comets. But such motion, though natural for the fifth elements, is super-natural for fire. Simplicius reveals that the Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias recognised the need to supplement Aristotle and account for the annual approach and retreat of planets by means of Ptolemy's epicycles or eccentrics. Aristotle's philosopher-god is turned by Simplicius, following his teacher Ammonius, into a creator-god, like Plato's. But the creation is beginningless, as shown by the argument that, if you try to imagine a time when it began, you cannot answer the question, 'Why not sooner?' In explaining the creation, Simplicius follows the Neoplatonist expansion of Aristotle's four 'causes' to six. The final result gives us a cosmology very considerably removed from Aristotle's."--Bloomsbury Publishing In chapter 1 of On the Heavens Aristotle defines body, and then notoriously ruptures dynamics by introducing a fifth element, beyond Plato's four, to explain the rotation of the heavens, which, like nearly all Greeks, Aristotle took to be real, not apparent. Even a member of his school, Xenarchus, we are told, rejected his fifth element. The Neoplatonist Simplicius seeks to harmonise Plato and Aristotle. Plato, he says, thought that the heavens were composed of all four elements but with the purest kind of fire, namely light, predominating. That Plato would not mind this being called a fifth element is shown by his associating with the heavens the fifth of the five convex regular solids recognised by geometry. Simplicius follows Aristotle's view that one of the lower elements, fire, also rotates, as shown by the behaviour of comets. But such motion, though natural for the fifth elements, is super-natural for fire. Simplicius reveals that the Aristotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias recognised the need to supplement Aristotle and account for the annual approach and retreat of planets by means of Ptolemy's epicycles or eccentrics. Aristotle's philosopher-god is turned by Simplicius, following his teacher Ammonius, into a creator-god, like Plato's. But the creation is beginningless, as shown by the argument that, if you try to imagine a time when it began, you cannot answer the question, 'Why not sooner?' In explaining the creation, Simplicius follows the Neoplatonist expansion of Aristotle's four 'causes' to six. The final result gives us a cosmology very considerably removed from Aristotle's.