William N. Still, Jr.

A very readable (though lengthy) analysis of what caused the South to surrender to the North in 1865 -- when, per the authors, the south had not been militarily defeated (i.e., it had the means to continue military operations in a variety of ways) and was unlikely to be defeated and "conquered" militarily. At the end, they contrast the South's war against the North with Paraguay's war against the Triple Alliance of Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina to demonstrate a nation's absolute will to resist to the end -- demonstrating that the surrender was a decision. The book, then, discusses the many factors that have been addressed by scholars for the last hundred plus years concerning the South's decision to not continue the fight. Very interesting, very well researched, and written in a way that holds the interest of the layman (these folks are very good writers IMHO). For those wishing a greater understanding of the end of the Civil War, this is a very good choice.

"Victory Without Peace concentrates on the U.S. Navy in European and Near Eastern waters during the post-World War I era. The Navy was charged with executing the naval terms of the Armistice as well as preserving stability and peace. U.S. warships were deploying into the Near East, Baltic, Adriatic, and Northern Europe. Conversely, Congressional appropriations handicapped this deployment by demobilization, general naval policy and postwar personnel and operating funds reductions"--