Robert J. Lieber

The American Era makes a provocative argument about America's world role. It sets out the case for a grand strategy that recognizes American preponderance as necessary and desirable for coping with the perils of the post-9/11 world. The book argues firstly that, Militant Islamic terrorism and weapons of mass destruction pose a threat which requires us to alter the way we think about the pre-emptive and preventive use of force. Secondly, the UN and other international bodies are incapable of acting on these urgent problems. Thirdly, in an international system with no true central authority other countries will inevitably look for leadership to the US. The book argues that if America does not respond actively to terrorist threats, no one else will take the initiative.

This important and original volume assesses what we now know about world politics and American foreign policy after more than a decade of the post-Cold War era, and the wider implications of this experience both for the U.S role in the 21st Century and for international relations more broadly. The chapter authors are leading authorities in their fields, and their contributions integrate both foreign and domestic setting for foreign policy. Part I looks at public opinion, debates about humanitarian intervention, the use of force in foreign conflicts, and congressional-executive relations in the making of foreign policy. Part II deals with the key regional issues confronting the United States, including the Middle East, Europe, Russia, China and East Asia, Latin America and Africa. Part III addresses major functional topics, including international economics and trade, defense policy, proliferation, “rogue” states, the environment, and America's relationship to the United Nations. For individuals interested in the United State's degree of international primacythe impact of domestic politics on its world role, and the longer-term implications of foreign policy.

The author attempts to apply some of the more complex social science theories and methods to the area of international relations.

"To argue against the widely proclaimed idea of American decline might seem a lonely task. After all, the problems are real and serious. Yet if we take a longer view, much of the discourse about decline appears exaggerated, hyperbolic and ahistorical. Why? First, because of the deep underlying strengths of the United States. These include not only size, population, demography and resources, but also the scale and importance of its economy and financial markets, its scientific research and technology, its competitiveness, its military power and its attractiveness to talented immigrants. Second, there is the weight of history and of American exceptionalism. Throughout its history, the United States has repeatedly faced and eventually overcome daunting challenges and crises. Contrary to a prevailing pessimism, there is nothing inevitable about American decline. Ultimately, the ability to avoid serious decline is less a question of material factors than of policy, leadership and political will"-- "'The United States cannot afford another decline like that which has characterized the past decade and a half.....Only self-delusion can keep us from admitting our decline to ourselves.' -- Henry A. Kissinger, 1961. In the above words, one of America's most distinguished strategic thinkers and policymakers expresses alarm at America's condition and the perils it faces. The warning seems timely, yet it was written more than half a century ago as an assessment of the Soviet threat, problems with allies and the developing world, and in frustration with what the author saw as dangerously inadequate policy and strategic choices. Henry Kissinger was by no means alone. He cited George Kennan's lament about our domestic failings with race, the cities, the education and environment of our young people, and the gap between expert knowledge and popular understanding, even while criticizing Kennan's focus on those problems to the exclusion of military and diplomatic threats"--