Martin Kusch

"Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language has attracted much criticism and few friends, yet it is one of the books that most students of philosophy have to read at some point in their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to debates that strike at the very heart of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch defends Kripke's account against the numerous objections that have been put forward over the past twenty years, arguing that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning, many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position, and many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace. Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument a new strength. Book jacket."--BOOK JACKET.

Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that psychological knowledge is knowledge about, and held by, the individual mind. Psychological Knowledge challenges these views. It argues that bodies of psychological knowledge are social institutions like money or the monarchy, and that mental states are social artefacts like coins or crowns. Psychological Knowledge is both an introduction to the workings of constructivism as well as an insightful exploration of the history of psychology and the recent developments in philosophy of the mind.

Antinaturalism rose to dominance in the debate on psychologism among German academic philosophers at the turn of the century. Psychologism, according to received opinion, was decisively refuted by Frege and Husserl. Kusch therefore examines their arguments and, crucially, relates them to the context that shaped that debate and gave those arguments their persuasive force. Drawing on perspectives pioneered by the sociology of scientific knowledge, he reconstructs the dynamics of the psychologism debate; he uncovers its causes and weighs the factors that determine its outcome. What emerges is the fascinating picture of a struggle, between 'pure' philosophy and the newly emerging experimental psychology, for academic status, social influence and institutional power. The triumph of antinaturalism, far from being the only logical conclusion, was dependent on historical contingency. Introducing forms of analysis new to the history of philosophy, psychologism will make fascinating reading for lecturers and students of philosophy, psychology, sociology and cognitive science; it will also stimulate renewed debate on the prospects of antinaturalism at the close of this century.

As is well known, Wittgenstein had a life-long interest in the philosophy of colour, from the Tractatus all the way to the last notebooks that were posthumously published as two books, Remarks on Colour and On Certainty. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s various re­flections of the perception and classification of colours have already been analyzed by a number of in­fluential interpreters. These interpreters have often sought to illuminate Wittgenstein’s views by relating them to other, earlier treatments of phenomena of colour, for example those written by Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), Philipp Otto Runge (1777-1810), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), Franz Clemens Brentano (1838-1917), or David Katz (1884-1953).¹One aim of my paper is to add a new “foil” to this list: I want to make plausible that a number of Wittgenstein’s remarks on colour are responses to late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century British and American work on the psychology and anthropology of colour. I am not the first to put forward this idea – it is mentioned in a recent paper by the historian of science Simon Schaffer (2010: 279). But Schaffer’s comment is brief, and he provides only little evidence. So there remains plenty for me to do. I have a second aim, too. I want to argue that Wittgenstein’s comments are still of systematic interest today. The link between the historical thesis and the systematic concern is established by the fact that a very influential body of contemporary work in the anthropology of colour is strongly influenced by the early British work. Presumably, if Wittgenstein’s comments work as criticism of the latter, it will also weaken the appeal of the former. My paper falls into three parts. Section 2 gives an introduction to the relevant psychological and anthropological studies. Section 3 situates some of Wittgenstein’s comments vis-à-vis these investigations. Chapter 4 summarises my observations.

What can humans do? What can machines do? How do humans delegate actions to machines? In this book, Harry Collins and Martin Kusch combine insights from sociology and philosophy to provide a novel answer to these increasingly important questions.

The exhibition #fuckreality opens doors to virtual worlds. The image is omnipresent: Entranced people staring at displays on their televisions, smartphones, tablets, or computers. The launch into a new era of virtuality is in full swing, and innovations in virtual reality technologies are pushing forward in great strides. The exhibition #fuckreality at the Kunstraum Niederoesterreich focuses on a topic that the art world often neglects because it is stigmatised by associations with Hollywood productions and the globalised taste of the masses. Is it even possible to counter the commercial interests of Google & Co and reveal new modes of perception? #fuckreality presents artistic positions that explore and question the promise of the ditigal world.00Exhibition: Kunstraum Niederösterreich, Vienna, Austria (04.10. - 17.11.2018).

One important strand in the contemporary debate over epistemological relativism focuses on the question whether, and to what extent, Wittgenstein in “On Certainty” (1969) leaned towards this position. This paper is a contribution to this strand. My discussion has four parts. I shall begin by out lining my interpretation of Wittgensteinian certainties. Subsequently I shall briefly introduce some central arguments for and against attributing epistemic relativism to “On Certainty”. This will be followed by a sketch of the cluster of ideas that–on my analysis–define important versions of the doctrine in question. And finally I shall give my own interpretation of “On Certainty” in relation to epistemic relativism.

"Until 30 years ago, most sociologists believed that only knowledge in the humanities and social sciences is open to sociological analysis. This is no longer the case: a large number of studies have shown that the knowledge of science and technology also has the character of social institutions. The success of sociologists in understanding the social dimensions of science and technology has led to a relative decline of sociological studies of the humanities in general, philosophy in particular. This anthology seeks to correct that neglect. The authors seek to show that contextual and sociological sensitivity is crucial to an understanding of the very content of philosophical positions and controversies, and for recapturing the contingency in the history of philosophy." "Audience: All students of the history of philosophy and sociologists of knowledge."--Jacket.