Margaret Scotford Archer

Building on her seminal contribution to social theory in Culture and agency, Margaret Archer develops here her morphogenetic approach, applying it to the problem of structure and agency. Since structure and agency constitute different levels of stratified social reality, each possesses distinctive emergent properties which are real and causally efficacious but irreducible to one another. The problem, therefore, is shown to be how to link the two rather than conflate them, as has been common practice - whether in upwards conflation (by the aggregation of individual acts) downwards conflation (through the structural orchestration of agents), or, more recently, in central conflation which holds the two to be mutually constitutive and thus precludes any examination of their interplay by eliding them. Realist social theory: the morphogenetic approach thus not only rejects methodological individualism and collectivism, but argues that the debate between them has been replaced by a new one between elisionary theorizing (such as Giddens' structuration theory) and the emergentist theories based on a realist ontology of the social world. The morphogenetic approach is the sociological complement of transcendental realism, and together they provide a basis for non-conflationary theorizing which is also of direct utility to the practising social analyst.

xxvi, 343 p. ; 24 cm

"Many social theorists now call themselves 'relational sociologists', but mean entirely different things by it. The majority endorse a 'flat ontology', dealing exclusively with dyadic relations. Consequently, they cannot explain the context in which relationships occur or their consequences, except as resultants of endless 'transactions'. This book adopts a different approach which regards 'the relation' itself as an emergent property, with internal causal effects upon its participants and external ones on others. The authors argue that most 'relationists' seem unaware that analytical philosophers, such as Searle, Gilbert and Tuomela, have spent years trying to conceptualize the 'We' as dependent upon shared intentionality. Donati and Archer change the focus away from 'We thinking' and argue that 'We-ness' derives from subjects' reflexive orientations towards the emergent relational 'goods' and 'evils' they themselves generate. Their approach could be called 'relational realism', though they suggest that realists, too, have failed to explore the 'relational subject'"-- "More and more social theorists are now calling themselves 'Relational Sociologists', but they mean entirely different things by this term. It can cover anything from reductionist methodological individualism to a form of holistic sociological imperialism that deems all our relations to be exclusively 'social'. The majority, however, endorse a 'flat ontology', dealing exclusively with dyadic relations. Consequently, they cannot explain the context in which relationships occur despite there being no such thing as context-less action. It also means that the outcomes of relationality can be explained only as the result of an endless series of 'transactions', whose aggregation would somehow account for social stability and change. The approach of this book is quite different, in regarding the 'the relation' itself as an emergent property, with internal causal effects upon its participants and external ones on others. A second difference is that many of these 'Relationists' appear unaware that analytical philosophers, such as John Searle, Margaret Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela, have spent twenty years trying to vindicate a concept of the 'We', that gives rise to commitment, cooperation and collective action; one that also generates deontic rights: obligations, rights, and duties. In this book, however, 'We-ness' is held to derive from subjects' reflexive orientations towards the emergent relational 'goods' and 'evils' they themselves generate - then affecting their actions in a couple, a work group, sport's team, orchestra, voluntary association or social movement. Both authors could be called 'Relational Realists', but we have something to offer to Realism too, which, despite its humanism, has failed to explore the 'Relational Subject'"--