John A. Gentry

Lost Promise describes and critiques the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency of the analytical arm of the agency. Gentry first describes the DI's historical and avowed mission, and in so doing, he sets a standard for comparison with the troubled operations of the DI since the early 1980s. He proposes an 18-point reform program and helps to lift the fog that surrounds the CIA and which protects it from serious external evaluation. Gentry corrects misunderstandings about CIA analysis and explains how analysis can become biased or "politicized." Lost Promise presents a framework for general intelligence evaluation, using the DI as a case study. Contents PART I: CIA's Directorate of Intelligence; The Institution in Practice; How It Got That Way; Implications of Current Practices; Recommendations for Reform; A Primer on Review and Politicization; Lessons of the 1991 Gates Nomination for DCI. PART II: Perception Versus Reality; Explanations, Corrections, and Comments; Toward a Critics' Paradigm; Appendix: CIA Credo; Glossary of Intelligence Acronyms; Figures (including photographs and portraits).

This provocative book seeks to answer a most crucial―and embarrassing―question concerning the U.S. military: why the United States is so often stymied in military confrontations with seemingly weaker opponents, despite its "superpower" status. This fascinating book examines a question that continues to puzzle soldiers, statesmen, and scholars: why do major powers―including the ostensible superpower United States―repeatedly perform poorly against seemingly overmatched adversaries? And what can they, and the United States, do to better achieve their military objectives? How Wars are Won and Lost: Vulnerability and Military Power argues that beyond relying solely on overwhelming military might, the United States needs to focus more on exploiting weaknesses in their adversaries―such as national will, resource mobilization, and strategic miscues―just as opposing forces have done to gain advantage over our military efforts. The author tests the "vulnerability theory" by revisiting six conflicts from the Philippine War of 1899-1902 to the ongoing actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, showing again and again that victory often depends more on outthinking the enemy than outmuscling them.

John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning ― the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action ― is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.

Neutering the CIA is an insider look at how political bias at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has undermined its effectiveness both domestically and internationally. The central case study is the impact of the bias on the interaction between the CIA and the Trump Administration, although the origins of the problem link to Robert Gates becoming head of CIA's analysis directorate in 1982, and then later, director of the CIA. Beginning in 2016, former and currently serving US intelligence officers, mainly from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), conducted a major political campaign featuring public commentary and leaks designed to thwart the presidential candidacy, and then the presidency, of Donald Trump. This "politicization" of intelligence, which traditionally is defined as the injection of personal or organizational perspectives into intelligence products to serve personal, ideological, or organizational interests of intelligence officers, reflected a remarkable change from the once-strong CIA ethos of apolitical public service. This book describes the startling political activism of intelligence officers in recent years, identifies its causes, and evaluates its many negative consequences. Most importantly, the activists damaged the credibility of US intelligence in the eyes of Trump Administration officials and undoubtedly many future senior national leaders, thereby eroding the trust in intelligence that decision-makers must have if they are to use intelligence effectively. Although the overt activism subsided in 2021, the Biden administration has not addressed its causes. The evident success of activists in helping to defeat Trump in 2020 surely has emboldened some intelligence officers, who remain poised to attack presidential candidates whose political views they dislike. This book also identifies actions needed to address this significant threat to American democracy.