Isaac Levi

"Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favour of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the value of the information lost by doing so. The rationale aims to be thoroughly decision theoretic. Levi spells out his goals and shows that certain types of recommendations are obtained if one seeks to promote these goals; he also compares his approach to his earlier account of inductive expansion. The recommendations are for 'mild contractions'. These are formally the same as the 'severe withdrawals' considered by Pagnucco and Rott, but the rationale is different. A critical part of the book concerns the elaboration of these differences. The results are relevant to accounts of the conditions under which it is legitimate to cease believing, and to accounts of conditionals. [This book] will be of great interest to all specialists in belief revision theory and to many students of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and pragmatism"--Bookjacket.

This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction, and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made "for the sake of the argument" sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such hypothetical belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two types of nonmonotonicity are the focus of this book. A detailed comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both belief-contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals important differences that have been overlooked. In arguing that the distinction between belief contravening and inductive nonmonotonicity plays a far greater role in deliberation and decision than it is given credit for, this major study will be required reading for all philosophers and logicians concerned with conditionals, decision theory, and inductive inference. It will also interest those in artificial intelligence who work on expert systems, default reasoning, and nonmonotonic reasoning.

"This is a collection of Isaac Levi's philosophical papers. Over the period represented by the work here, Professor Levi has developed an interrelated set of views, in the tradition of Peirce and Dewey, on epistemology and the philosophy of science and social science. This focus has been on the problem of induction and the growth of knowledge, the foundations of probability and the theory of rational decision making. His most important essays in these areas are assembled here, with an introduction setting out their main themes and connections. Part I considers how the aims of scientific inquiry should constrain its practice, employing the crucial notion of 'epistemic utility'. The essays in Part II explain Professor Levi's conception of human knowledge; those in Part III consider objective or statistical probability and evaluate the notion of potential surprise; while Part IV extends his views to central questions of individual and collective decision making. As a whole the volume presents a coherent, elaborated position which will be of great interest to a range of philosophers, decision theorists, welfare and social choice theorists and cognitive scientists"--Publisher description.

Hillary Clinton's candid reflections about the key moments during her time as Secretary of State, as well as her thoughts about how to navigate the challenges of the 21st century.