Alan S. Blinder

In an earlier paper (Blinder and Morgan, 2005), we created an experimental apparatus in which Princeton University students acted as ersatz central bankers, making monetary policy decisions both as individuals and in groups. In this study, we manipulate the size and leadership structure of monetary policy decisionmaking. We find no evidence of superior performance by groups that have designated leaders. Groups without such leaders do as well as or better than groups with well-defined leaders. Furthermore, we find rather little difference between the performance of four-person and eight-person groups; the larger groups outperform the smaller groups by a very small margin. Finally, we successfully replicate our Princeton results, at least qualitatively: Groups perform better than individuals, and they do not require more "time" to do so.

Focuses on the human and civil rights the handicapped are campaigning for, and on the various methods they are using to bring change to society and make it more aware of the needs of the disabled.

"Public opinion influences politicians, and therefore influences public policy decisions. What are the roles of self-interest, knowledge, and ideology in public opinion formation? And how do people learn about economic issues? Using a new, specially-designed survey, we find that most respondents express a strong desire to be well informed on economic policy issues, and that television is their dominant source of information. On a variety of major policy issues (e.g., taxes, social security, health insurance), ideology is the most important determinant of public opinion, while measures of self-interest are the least important. Knowledge about the economy ranks somewhere in between"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

"Based on the 1996 Lionel Robbins Lectures, this book deals succinctly, in a nontechnical manner, with a wide variety of issues in monetary policy, including the goals of monetary policy, the choice of monetary instrument, the rule-versus-discretion debate, suggested remedies for the alleged problem of "inflationary bias," central bank credibility, arguments for and against central bank independence, and the interplay between the central bank and financial markets. The author examines each issue from the point of view of both an academic economist and a practicing policymaker - calling attention to the differences and similarities of perspective along the way."--BOOK JACKET.