Adrian Vermeule

"Abstract: Stock debates about transparency and secrecy usually assume that open voting and secret voting are mutually exclusive. But these positions present a false alternative; open and secret voting can be employed as complements in a larger decision-procedure. In what follows I will propose a hybrid or dual procedure of open-secret voting, and attempt to specify the conditions under which that procedure works well. I suggest that open-secret voting can best be justified as an institutional means of obtaining a second opinion from the voting group. A second opinion of this sort might produce informational benefits either for the members of the voting group itself, for outsideparties, or for both. (This is a companion paper to Adrian Vermeule, "Second Opinions" available on SSRN)---John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.

"Abstract: A system effect arises when the properties of an aggregate differ from the properties of its members, taken one by one. The failure to recognize system effects leads to fallacies of division and composition, in which the analyst mistakenly assumes that what is true of the aggregate must also be true of the members, or that what is true of the members must also be true of the aggregate. Examples are (1) the fallacious assumption that if the overall constitutional order is to be democratic, each of its component institutions must be democratic, taken one by one; (2) the fallacious assumption that if judges are politically biased, courts will issue politically biased rulings. In these cases and many others I will discuss, system effects are an indispensable analytic tool for legal theory. A systemic approach implies that the choices of legal actors are strategically interdependent: the best course of action for any given actor will depend upon what other actors do. Judges deciding how to interpret statutes and the constitution, for example, cannot simply assume, idealistically, that it would be best for them to adopt the approach that would be best for all if adopted by all. If others do not adopt that approach, then the nature of the best approach for the given judge may itself change, taking others' actions as nonideal constraints. The implication is a second-best approach to constitutionalism and legal interpretation.The judge who takes system effects into account may change her approach in light of the behavior of her colleagues and the behavior of other institutions. Although such a judge is strategic, it does not follow that she is unprincipled. Rather, under identifiable conditions, the systemically-minded judge will be a strategic legalist who attempts to act, within the constraints that arise from others' behavior, so as to nudge the legal system toward the best possible state, according to her view of the law. Indeed, the systemically-minded judge may even be a legal chameleon who changes her approach as the legal environment, including the behavior of other judges, changes around her, until the court as a whole reaches an equilibrium of optimal diversity. Although such a course of action is psychologically demanding, the systemic benefits that the legal chameleon creates can be attained at the systemic level instead. Wise appointments by Presidents and Senators aiming to diversify the judiciary would mimic, in a second-best way, the diversity that a bench of legal chameleons would produce"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.

Vermeule denies the view that the limits of reason counsel in favour of judges making 'living' constitutional law in the style of the common law. Instead, he proposes and defends a 'codified constitution' - a regime in which legislatures have the primary authority to develop constitutional law over time.

In the wake of 9/11, the United States government has relied on a number of aggressive security measures to protect the nation. From domestic wiretapping without warrants to the surveillance of Muslim and Arab Americans and the coercive interrogation of suspected terrorists, the Bush administration's policies have attracted much controversy and been decried as outrageous violations of domestic and international law. In Terror in the Balance, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that the legal and institutional basis of this critique is wrong. When governments strive to increase national security they should be given wide latitude to adjust policy and liberties in the time of emergency and war. Deference to the executive during emergencies, Posner and Vermeule contend, is necessary and powers must be made available to the executive when the increase in security justifies the corresponding losses from the decrease in liberty. Further, when the executive is compelled to implement controversial methods of protecting its citizens such as discrimination against aliens or censorship of hate speech, the judiciary should not interfere on constitutional grounds except in unusual circumstances. Courts and legislators are institutionally incapable of second guessing security policy, and trying to enforce ordinary law during times of emergency shackles government when it most needs flexibility. American constitutional law and international law do not provide reasons for courts or legislators to depart from their historical posture of deference to the executive during national emergencies. - Publisher.

"Ronald Dworkin once imagined law as an empire and judges as its princes. But over time, the arc of law has bent steadily toward deference to the administrative state. Adrian Vermeule argues that law has freely abandoned its imperial pretensions, and has done so for internal legal reasons. In area after area, judges and lawyers, working out the logical implications of legal principles, have come to believe that administrators should be granted broad leeway to set policy, determine facts, interpret ambiguous statutes, and even define the boundaries of their own jurisdiction. Agencies have greater democratic legitimacy and technical competence to confront many issues than lawyers and judges do. And as the questions confronting the state involving climate change, terrorism, and biotechnology (to name a few) have become ever more complex, legal logic increasingly indicates that abnegation is the wisest course of action"--

"The Constitution of Risk is the first book to combine constitutional theory with the theory of risk regulation. The book argues that constitutional rulemaking is best understood as a means of managing political risks. Constitutional law structures and regulates the risks that arise in and from political life, such as an executive coup or military putsch, political abuse of ideological or ethnic minorities, or corrupt self-dealing by officials. The book claims that the best way to manage political risks is an approach it calls "optimizing constitutionalism" - in contrast to the worst-case thinking that underpins "precautionary constitutionalism," a mainstay of liberal constitutional theory. Drawing on a broad range of disciplines such as decision theory, game theory, welfare economics, political science, and psychology, this book advocates constitutional rulemaking undertaken in a spirit of welfare maximization, and offers a corrective to the pervasive and frequently irrational attitude of distrust of official power that is so prominent in American constitutional history and discourse"--

"Many Americans fear the power of unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats-the "deep state." Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule seek to calm those fears by proposing a moral regime to ensure that government rulemakers behave transparently and don't abuse their authority. The administrative state may be a Leviathan, but it can be a principled one"--

"Abstract: There is a burgeoning literature on second opinions in professional contexts, as when patients or clients seek advice from a second doctor or lawyer. My aim, by contrast, is to analyze second opinions as a central feature of public law. I will try to show that many institutional structures, rules and practices have been justified as mechanisms for requiring or permitting decisionmakers to obtain second opinions; examples include judicial review of statutes or of agency action, bicameralism, the separation of powers, and the law of legislative procedure. I attempt to identify the main costs and benefits of these second-opinion mechanisms, to identify conditions under which they prove more or less successful, and to consider how the lawmaking system might employ such mechanisms to greater effect. I claim, among other things, that Alexander Bickel's justification of judicial review as a "sober second thought" is untenable, and that the Supreme Court should adopt a norm that two successive decisions, not merely one, are necessary to create binding law"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.

In established constitutional polities, Vermeule argues, law can and should - and to some extent already does - provide mechanisms of democracy: small-scale institutional devices and innovations that can have surprisingly large effects, promoting democratic values of impartial, accountable and deliberative government.

Adrian Vermeule analyses constitutionalism through the lens of systems theory, originally developed in biology, computer science, political science and other disciplines.