Discover

Market distortions when agents are better informed

Minsik users reviews
0.0 (0)
Other platforms reviews
0.0 (0)
33 pages
~33 min to read
National Bureau of Economic Research 1 views
Editions
Electronic Resource
1 views
Minsik want to read: 0
Minsik reading: 0
Minsik read: 0
Open Library want to read: 0
Open Library reading: 0
Open Library read: 0

Description

"Agents are often better informed than the clients who hire them and may exploit this informational advantage. Real-estate agents, who know much more about the housing market than the typical homeowner, are one example. Because real estate agents receive only a small share of the incremental profit when a house sells for a higher value, there is an incentive for them to convince their clients to sell their houses too cheaply and too quickly. We test these predictions by comparing home sales in which real estate agents are hired by others to sell a home to instances in which a real estate agent sells his or her own home. In the former case, the agent has distorted incentives; in the latter case, the agent wants to pursue the first-best. Consistent with the theory, we find homes owned by real estate agents sell for about 3.7 percent more than other houses and stay on the market about 9.5 days longer, even after controlling for a wide range of housing characteristics. Situations in which the agent's informational advantage is larger lead to even greater distortions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Detailed Ratings

0.0Emotional Impact
No ratings yet
0.0Intellectual Depth
No ratings yet
0.0Writing Quality
No ratings yet
0.0Rereadability
No ratings yet
0.0Pacing
No ratings yet
0.0Readability
No ratings yet
0.0Plot Complexity
No ratings yet
0.0Humor
No ratings yet

Check out this book on other platforms

Open Library