Grave of a dozen schemes

In late 1943 as the prospect of victory over Germany became discernible, the British high command's attention turned toward the Pacific. At issue was Great Britain's role in what would be the final stage of the Japanese war. Given conflicting strategic considerations, the lack of facilities, supplies, and men, and a navy unfamiliar with large-scale carrier operations, the search for a national strategy against the Japanese was to take a full year. Within the British high command, a bitter debate raged between a prime minister intent upon an Indian Ocean-based amphibious strategy and the service chiefs who recognized that an Upper Burma commitment was unavoidable and saw that the employment of a carrier force in the central Pacific was highly desirable. With this book a noted British naval and military historian follows the debate, tracing the way that policy was shaped as much by the unfolding of events as by deliberate calculations. Drawing on British Cabinet, service, and planning papers, H. P. Willmott examines a process and issues that remain relevant today - the formulation of national policy, its joint-service application and reconstitution, and the confusion of political and military arguments at the highest levels of policy-making. In addition, he examines the decisions that were made against the record of achievement in 1944-1945.